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Minnesota Bounties On Dakota Men During The U.S.-Dakota War
Abstract
The U.S.-Dakota War was one of the formative events in Minnesota history, and despite the passage of time, it
still stirs up powerful emotions among descendants of the Dakota and white settlers who experienced this
tragedy. Hundreds of people lost their lives in just over a month of fighting in 1862. By the time the year was
over, thirty-eight Dakota men had been hanged in the largest mass execution in United States history. Not
long afterwards, the United States abrogated its treaties with the Dakota, confiscated their reservations along
the Minnesota River, and forced most of the Dakota to remove westward.
While dozens of books and articles have been written about these events, scholars have largely ignored an
important legal development that occurred in Minnesota during the following summer. The Minnesota
Adjutant General, at the direction of Minnesota Governors Alexander Ramsey and Henry Swift, issued a
series of orders offering rewards for the killing of Dakota men found within the State. The first order
authorized the creation of a corps of volunteer scouts that would scour the "Big Woods" in search of Dakota
men. They were to be paid not only a daily wage, but an additional $25 for each scalp they were able to provide
the Adjutant General's Office. Subsequent orders permitted individual citizens who were not part of the
volunteer corps to claim up to $200 for proof that they had killed a Dakota. These bounty orders remained in
effect until at least 1868, when their constitutionality was finally questioned by the Minnesota Supreme Court
in State v. Gut.
Minnesota was not the only state that placed a bounty on their Indian inhabitants. Around the same time, a
bounty system was enacted by the Territory of Arizona, and one was also implemented by private citizens and
local governments within the State of California. Like the bounty system in Minnesota, these programs were
creatures of state and territorial law, but they were implicitly and explicitly approved by the federal
government. In fact, they could be viewed as part of a much broader extermination program that was at the
heart of federal Indian policy during this time period.
This article uses primary historical sources to describe the events leading up to the enactment of a bounty
system in Minnesota, its creation, and subsequent on-the-ground implementation. In an attempt to avoid the
pitfalls of "presentism," the legality of this bounty system is analyzed according to the laws in effect in 1863,
when it was created. This article concludes that the Minnesota bounty system was illegal from its inception, as
it was contrary not only the international law of war, but also the Lieber Code, which was issued by the U.S.
Secretary of War in April 1863, and used to govern the conduct of Union soldiers during the ongoing Civil
War.
Keywords
U.S.-Dakota War, bounties, bounty orders, mass execution, volunteer corps, extermination policy, Lieber
Code, presentism, indigenous peoples, State v. Gut
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INTRODUCTION 
The U.S.-Dakota War was one of the formative events in 
Minnesota history, and despite the passage of time, it still stirs up 
powerful emotions among descendants of the Dakota1 and white 
 
       †   Associate Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. The author 
would like to thank Jennifer Otto, Mary Bakeman, Chris Yoshimura-Rank, Lucas 
Adams, and the reference librarians at the Minnesota Historical Society for their 
research assistance, and Phebe Haugen and Dr. Bruce White for their helpful 
comments on an earlier draft. 
 1.  This article uses the term “Dakota” to refer to the Mdewakanton, 
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settlers who experienced this tragedy. Hundreds of people lost 
their lives in just over a month of fighting in 1862.2 By the time the 
year was over, thirty-eight Dakota men had been hanged in the 
largest mass execution in United States history.3 Not long 
afterwards, the United States abrogated its treaties with the 
Dakota,4 confiscated their reservations along the Minnesota River, 
and forced most of the Dakota to move westward.5 Generals Henry 
Sibley and Alfred Sully then led expeditions into the Dakota 
Territory to hunt down those Dakota who had refused to surrender 
and accept this fate.6 
 
Sisseton, Wahpeton, and Wahpekute tribes. Historical documents refer to these 
groups as the “eastern Sioux,” but the term “Sioux” is a French abbreviation of the 
Algonquin word meaning “enemy,” and its continued use is discouraged by many 
contemporary Dakota people. See GARY CLAYTON ANDERSON, LITTLE CROW: 
SPOKESMAN FOR THE SIOUX 6 (1986) [hereinafter ANDERSON, LITTLE CROW]. 
 2.  Estimates of the number of dead on both sides of the war have varied 
over the years. Most likely, 500–600 non-Indians were killed during the fighting in 
August and September 1862. See MARION P. SATTERLEE, A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF 
THE MASSACRE BY THE DAKOTA INDIANS OF MINNESOTA IN 1862, at 124 (1923) 
(concluding, after thorough research, that 490 whites (military and civilian) were 
killed); Letter from Major-Gen. John Pope to Major-Gen. Henry Halleck (Sept. 23, 
1862), in 13 U.S. DEP’T OF WAR, THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE 
OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, SERIES I 663, 663 (1885) 
[hereinafter WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. I] (claiming that “over 500 people” were 
killed in Minnesota); CURTIS A. DAHLIN, THE DAKOTA UPRISING: A PICTORIAL 
HISTORY 1 (2009) [hereinafter DAHLIN, DAKOTA UPRISING] (asserting that a 
“conservative estimate” of whites killed in the 1862 War was 600). Little has been 
written about the number of Dakota casualties during 1862, so it is harder to 
provide an accurate estimate of their losses. KENNETH CARLEY, THE DAKOTA WAR OF 
1862: MINNESOTA’S OTHER CIVIL WAR 1 n.* (noting that “we have no clear idea of 
[Dakota] losses”). Compare SATTERLEE, supra, at 107–08 (listing thirty Dakota killed 
during fighting in 1862), with Report of Colonel Henry Sibley (Sept. 23, 1862), 
in 13 WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, supra, at 279 (Sibley reporting that thirty 
Dakota were killed in the battle of Wood Lake alone), and Camp Release from 
Brigadier-Gen. Henry Sibley to Major-Gen. John Pope (Oct. 17, 1862), in 13 WAR 
OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, supra, at 745. Far more Dakota died as a result of General 
Sibley’s and General Sully’s military campaigns of 1863 and 1864. See, e.g., Letter 
from Major-Gen. John Pope to Major-Gen. Henry Halleck (Aug. 14, 1863), in 12 
U.S. DEP’T OF WAR, WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, PART II 451, 451 (1885) 
(reporting 150 Dakota dead from Sibley’s expedition); Letter from Major-Gen. 
John Pope to Sec’y of War Edwin Stanton (Sept. 22, 1863), in 12 WAR OF THE 
REBELLION, SER. I, PART II, supra, at 569 (reporting over one hundred Dakota dead 
from Sully’s expedition). 
 3.  MARY LETHERT WINGERD, NORTH COUNTRY: THE MAKING OF MINNESOTA 
327 (2010). 
 4.  Act of Feb. 16, 1863, ch. 37, 12 Stat. 652, 652–54. 
 5.  Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 199, 12 Stat. 819, 819–20. 
 6.  MICHEAL CLODFELTER, THE DAKOTA WAR: THE UNITED STATES ARMY VERSUS 
THE SIOUX, 1862–1865, at 80–87 (1998). 
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Not all of the Dakota were removed from Minnesota, however. 
The United States allowed certain “friendly” or “loyal” Dakota, who 
had helped whites during the War to remain within the state.7 
Additionally, a small number of Dakota made their way back into 
the state during the spring of 1863, conducting raids on settlers 
while looking for horses they could take to make their permanent 
escape westward.8 Swept away by hysterical reports of hundreds of 
Dakota lurking in the Big Woods just waiting to attack,9 the 
Minnesota Adjutant General, at the direction of Minnesota 
Governors Alexander Ramsey and Henry Swift, issued a series of 
orders offering rewards for the killing of Dakota men found within 
the state.10 The first order authorized the creation of a corps of 
volunteer scouts that would scour the Big Woods in search of 
Dakota men.11 They were to be paid not only a daily wage, but an 
additional $25 for each scalp they were able to provide the 
Adjutant General’s Office.12 Subsequent orders permitted 
individual citizens who were not part of the volunteer corps to 
claim up to $200 for proof that they had killed a Dakota.13 These 
bounty orders remained in effect until at least 1868, when their 
constitutionality was finally questioned by the Minnesota Supreme 
Court in State v. Gut.14 
While dozens of books and articles have been written about 
the U.S-Dakota War, no one has focused on the bounty system that 
 
 7.  2 WILLIAM WATTS FOLWELL, A HISTORY OF MINNESOTA 263–64 (1961); see 
also HENRY BENJAMIN WHIPPLE, LIGHTS AND SHADOWS OF A LONG EPISCOPATE 133–34 
(1912) (discussing how some of the Dakota who had rescued white captives during 
the war, as well as the wives and children of Dakota scouts used by General Sibley, 
remained living within Minnesota on land provided by Alexander Faribault); 
The Friendly Indians, ST. PAUL PIONEER & DEMOCRAT (WEEKLY), May 5, 1865 
(discussing attempts to secure land for these “friendly” Indians). 
 8.  ISAAC V. D. HEARD, HISTORY OF THE SIOUX WAR AND MASSACRES OF 1862 
AND 1863, at 300 (1865); THROUGH DAKOTA EYES: NARRATIVE ACCOUNTS OF THE 
MINNESOTA INDIAN WAR OF 1862, at 280 (Gary Clayton Anderson & Alan R. 
Woolworth eds., 1988) [hereinafter THROUGH DAKOTA EYES]. 
 9.  WINGERD, supra note 3, at 329. The “Big Woods” was an area of deciduous 
forest that covered much of the middle portion of the State of Minnesota and was 
used by both Ojibwe and Dakota hunting parties. SCOTT W. BERG, 38 NOOSES: 
LINCOLN, LITTLE CROW AND THE BEGINNING OF THE FRONTIER’S END 6 (2012). 
 10.  See infra Part II.A. 
 11.  ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, reprinted in EXECUTIVE 
DOCUMENTS OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA FOR THE YEAR 1863, at 61, 192–93 (1864) 
[hereinafter 1863 MINN. EXEC. DOCS.] (General Orders No. 41). 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. at 198 (General Orders No. 60). 
 14.  State v. Gut, 13 Minn. 341 (1868), aff’d, 76 U.S. 35 (1869). 
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had a profound impact on Dakota remaining in or returning to 
Minnesota immediately following the War.15 The brief accounts that 
can be found in the existing literature are riddled with 
contradictions. Some claim that the bounty system was created by 
Governor Ramsey, others blame the Minnesota Legislature, and 
still others claim both were responsible.16 Scholars also disagree 
about the number of payments made under the Minnesota bounty 
system and to whom they were made.17 Finally, while much recent 
scholarship focuses on telling the stories of individual white settlers 
killed during the U.S.-Dakota War,18 no one has ever attempted to 
uncover the circumstances surrounding the killing of the Dakota 
men for which State bounty payments were made. 
Focusing attention on the Minnesota bounty system is 
necessary to provide a balanced perspective of the atrocities 
committed on both sides of the conflict. It is also important in a 
broader sense, because Minnesota was not the only state that 
placed a bounty on its Indian inhabitants. Around the same time, a 
bounty system was enacted by the territory of Arizona, and one was 
also implemented by private citizens and local governments within 
the state of California.19 Like the bounty system in Minnesota, these 
programs were creatures of state and territorial law, but they were 
implicitly and explicitly approved by the federal government. In 
fact, they could be viewed as part of a much broader extermination 
program that was at the heart of federal Indian policy during this 
time period.20 This program should not be whitewashed from the 
history of federal Indian policy. 
This article uses primary historical sources to describe the 
events leading up to the enactment of a bounty system in 
 
 15.  The most thorough treatment of the Minnesota bounty system can be 
found in an unpublished manuscript available only at the Minnesota Historical 
Society. See David L. Beaulieu, The Fate of Little Crow, 1863–1970 (1970) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Minnesota Historical Society). 
 16.  See, e.g., WINGERD, supra note 3, at 329 (“Thanks to Governor Ramsey and 
the state legislature, shooting Indians soon could be a profitable as well as 
satisfying pastime. By summer the state was offering bounties for Dakota scalps.”). 
 17.  For example, some scholars have erroneously claimed that either Nathan 
or Chauncey Lamson was paid $75 for Taoyateduta’s (Little Crow) scalp in 
addition to the $500 payment that was ultimately made by the Minnesota 
legislature. See infra note 188. 
 18.  See, e.g., CURTIS A. DAHLIN, DAKOTA UPRISING VICTIMS: GRAVESTONES & 
STORIES (2007) [hereinafter DAHLIN, GRAVESTONES]. 
 19.  See infra Part III. 
 20.  See infra Part III. 
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Minnesota, its creation, and subsequent on-the-ground 
implementation. In an attempt to avoid the pitfalls of “presentism,” 
the legality of this bounty system is analyzed according to the laws 
in effect in 1863, when it was created. This article concludes that 
the Minnesota bounty system was illegal from its inception, as it was 
contrary not only the international law of war, but also the Lieber 
Code, which was issued by the U.S. Secretary of War in April 1863 
and used to govern the conduct of Union soldiers during the 
ongoing Civil War.21 
I. BACKGROUND 
For the white settlers who lived in Minnesota, the U.S.-Dakota 
War seemed to begin without warning. For the Dakota, the war was 
the inevitable result of festering animosity surrounding the 
negotiation and implementation of treaties with the United States. 
In a series of treaties executed between 1837 and 1858, the Dakota 
ceded nearly all of their land in the State of Minnesota.22 These 
treaties were negotiated using intimidation, trickery, and outright 
fraud by the United States.23 By 1858, all that remained of the 
Dakota homeland was a small reservation 10 miles wide and 140 
miles long running along the south shore of the Minnesota River in 
southwestern Minnesota.24 
On this small strip of land the Dakota were unable to sustain 
themselves through their traditional means of hunting, fishing, and 
gathering. Some turned to farming, which was part of the 
assimilation program advanced by the United States.25 But many 
resisted these and other assimilation efforts, and their lives now 
depended on the annuities of cash and goods promised to them in 
the treaties. These annuities were always late in arriving, and when 
they did arrive, traders took the bulk of the money claiming that it 
 
 21.  See infra Parts III & IV. 
 22.  See Treaty with the Mdewakanton and Wahpekute Bands of the Sioux, 
Aug. 5, 1851, 10 Stat. 954; Treaty with the Sisseton and Wahpeton Bands of the 
Sioux, July 23, 1851, 10 Stat. 949; Treaty with the Sioux, Sept. 29, 1837, 7 Stat. 538. 
 23.  See, e.g., 2 FOLWELL, supra note 7, at 216–19; GWEN WESTERMAN & BRUCE 
WHITE, MNI SOTA MAKOCE: THE LAND OF THE DAKOTA 148–54 (2012); see also DAVID 
A. NICHOLS, LINCOLN AND THE INDIANS: CIVIL WAR POLICY AND POLITICS 65–66, 76 
(2012) (noting that Congress investigated Alexander Ramsey for his role in 1851 
treaty negotiations that led to the mishandling of $450,000 in Dakota money, and 
discussing the amount of money that passed directly to traders). 
 24.  CARLEY, supra note 2, at 3–4. 
 25.  2 FOLWELL, supra note 7, at 219–21. 
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was owed to them for goods purchased on credit. Federal Indian 
agents did little to reduce these frauds, as they were often complicit 
in them.26 Instead, the agents exacerbated the rifts growing within 
the Dakota community by making resources available only to those 
who were willing to participate in the United States’ assimilation 
programs. Meanwhile, white settlers continued flooding the area, 
encroaching on what little Dakota land remained. 
While the causes of the U.S.-Dakota War are numerous, 
scholars agree that starvation,27 trader fraud, conflicts with white 
settlers,28 corruption in Indian affairs,29 and the federal 
government’s misguided assimilation program30 were all 
contributing factors. The events of the summer of 1862 simply 
provided the necessary spark. 
A. The U.S.-Dakota War of 1862 
The winter of 1861–62 was a harsh one, and the 1862 annuity 
payment that was supposed to have been paid in June did not 
arrive.31 The Dakota received assurances that it would be paid the 
following month, and they began to congregate around the 
reservation’s Yellow Medicine (Upper) Agency.32 On July 14, food 
and other provisions arrived at the agency, but Indian Agent 
 
 26.  Id. at 214–15. 
 27.  Robert Hakewaste, who was an important member of Taoyateduta’s band 
in 1862, later recalled in testimony before a U.S. commission that “[w]e were in a 
starving condition and desperate state of mind,” yet “the [Indian] agent did not 
give us food as he promised.” THROUGH DAKOTA EYES, supra note 8, at 32; see also 
WINGERD, supra note 3, at 301–02 (noting that the Dakota were in “an extremely 
destitute condition,” yet the traders would not allow them to buy goods on credit 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 28.  GARY CLAYTON ANDERSON, KINSMEN OF ANOTHER KIND: DAKOTA-WHITE 
RELATIONS IN THE UPPER MISSISSIPPI VALLEY, 1650–1862, at 252–53 (1997) 
[hereinafter ANDERSON, KINSMEN] (noting that in the weeks preceding the war, the 
Dakota “held nightly discussions regarding the increasing number of white 
settlers, the actions of the traders, and the delay in the cash payment”). 
 29.  NICHOLS, supra note 23, at 65–76, 92; see THROUGH DAKOTA EYES, 
supra note 8, at 24, 29–30 (relaying Big Eagle’s and Wabasha’s accounts of the 
causes of the war). 
 30.  THROUGH DAKOTA EYES, supra note 8, at 23–27 (providing Big Eagle’s 
account of the causes of the war, as well as discussing the government’s 
assimilation program and the divisions that it created within the Dakota 
community). 
 31.  CARLEY, supra note 2, at 5; WINGERD, supra note 3, at 301–02; see also 
2 FOLWELL, supra note 7, at 228–29 (noting that the 1861 Dakota corn crops were 
destroyed by cutworms). 
 32.  ANDERSON, KINSMEN, supra note 28, at 249. 
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Thomas Galbraith33 refused to distribute it, believing that he should 
wait until the money annuities had arrived.34 By this time, 
thousands of hungry Dakota were gathered around the agency.35 
In early August, a group of Dakota men tried to break into a 
Yellow Medicine Agency’s warehouse holding food and other 
goods.36 This was an act of sheer desperation, as the warehouse was 
surrounded by troops and artillery.37 Missionary Stephen Riggs, 
Lieutenant Timothy Sheehan, and Captain John Marsh were 
ultimately able to avert a disaster by convincing Agent Galbraith to 
release some food under the condition that the Dakota would go 
home and return to the agency only when the money annuities had 
arrived.38 
Chief Taoyateduta, also known as Little Crow, was present 
during these negotiations and was promised that similar 
accommodations would be forthcoming for his band at the Lower 
Agency. But this promise was not kept.39 He told Agent Galbraith: 
We have waited a long time. The money is ours, but we 
cannot get it. We have no food, but here are these stores, 
filled with food. We ask that you, the agent, make some 
arrangement by which we can get food from the stores, or 
else we may take our own way to keep ourselves from 
starving.40 
Galbraith turned to the traders and asked them for their 
opinion. Trader Andrew Myrick said, “So far as I am concerned, if 
 
 33.  Thomas Galbraith took over the job as Indian Agent to the Dakota in 
May 1861. Galbraith had no experience with Indian issues, and he was arrogant, 
stubborn, and a drunk. Id. at 246; WINGERD, supra note 3, at 294. During the war, 
Chief Taoyateduta told Henry Sibley in a letter that “[f]or what reason we have 
commenced this war I will tell you, it is on account of Maj. Gilbrait [sic].” Letter 
from Little Crow to Colonel Henry Sibley (Sept. 7, 1862), in EXECUTIVE 
DOCUMENTS OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA FOR THE YEAR 1862, at 444, 444 (1863) 
[hereinafter 1862 MINN. EXEC. DOCS.]. 
 34.  2 FOLWELL, supra note 7, at 228–29; ROY W. MEYER, HISTORY OF THE SANTEE 
SIOUX: UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY ON TRIAL 112 (1967). 
 35.  ANDERSON, KINSMEN, supra note 28, at 249 (noting Lieutenant Timothy 
Sheehan “counted 659 lodges, or roughly seven thousand people”); 2 FOLWELL, 
supra note 7, at 228–29; MEYER, supra note 34, at 112; NICHOLS, supra note 23, 
at 77. 
 36.  CARLEY, supra note 2, at 5; WINGERD, supra note 3, at 302–03. 
 37.  2 FOLWELL, supra note 7, at 229; WINGERD, supra note 3, at 302–03.  
 38.  ANDERSON, KINSMEN, supra note 28, at 250; CARLEY, supra note 2, at 5–6; 
2 FOLWELL, supra note 7, at 229–30; MEYER, supra note 34, at 112–13. 
 39.  MEYER, supra note 34, at 114. 
 40.  2 FOLWELL, supra note 7, at 232. 
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they are hungry, let them eat grass or their own dung.”41 There was 
a moment of silence, and then the Dakota left the Lower Agency.42 
Not long thereafter, on the morning of August 17, 1862, four 
young Dakota men went out hunting in an area known as the Big 
Woods, approximately thirty miles east of the Redwood Agency.43 
They came upon Robinson Jones’s homestead in Acton Township 
(near present day Grove City), and before the morning was over, 
they had killed Jones, his wife, his teenage daughter, and two other 
men.44 The four Dakota men returned to their homes at the Rice 
Creek Village and consulted with Red Middle Voice, their 
headman.45 Red Middle Voice was concerned that federal officials 
would retaliate against all Dakota for the actions of these four 
young men. Ultimately, a council was convened that night at 
Taoyateduta’s village, and the decision was made to go to war.46 
The U.S.-Dakota War began the next morning, when Dakota 
warriors attacked the Lower Agency.47 Twenty whites were killed 
either in the initial attack or the subsequent flight.48 Among the 
dead was trader Andrew Myrick, whose body was found with grass 
stuffed in his mouth.49 From there, the Dakota traveled down the 
Minnesota River valley, attacking settlements in their path and, in 
many instances, killing civilians.50 
 
 41.  MEYER, supra note 34, at 114; see Letter from Little Crow to Colonel 
Henry Sibley, supra note 33, at 444. 
 42.  2 FOLWELL, supra note 7, at 233. 
 43.  ANDERSON, KINSMEN, supra note 28, at 253; THROUGH DAKOTA EYES, supra 
note 8, at 34. 
 44.  CARLEY, supra note 2, at 7–9. There are various accounts of the events that 
precipitated these killings. According to Chief Big Eagle, the men found a hen’s 
nest with some eggs in it. One of the Dakota men started to take the eggs when he 
was stopped by another who was afraid that they would get into trouble. THROUGH 
DAKOTA EYES, supra note 8, at 35–36. This made the first man angry. Id. He threw 
the eggs to the ground and said: “You are a coward. You are afraid of the white 
man. You are afraid to take even an egg from him, though you are half-starved.” 
Id. The other replied that he was not a coward, and he would prove it by shooting 
the white man who owned the eggs. Id. He dared the others to join him, and they 
did. Id. 
 45.  CARLEY, supra note 2, at 10; THROUGH DAKOTA EYES, supra note 8, at 36. 
 46.  CARLEY, supra note 2, at 10–12; MEYER, supra note 34, at 117; THROUGH 
DAKOTA EYES, supra note 8, at 36 (Big Eagle’s account). There are conflicting 
accounts regarding whether a council was held, who was present at the council, 
and whether war was formally declared. A more complete discussion of these 
issues can be found in infra Part IV.B. 
 47.  2 FOLWELL, supra note 7, at 109. 
 48.  CARLEY, supra note 2, at 14. 
 49.  Id.; MEYER, supra note 34, at 117. 
 50.  2 FOLWELL, supra note 7, at 110–11. 
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Minnesota Governor Alexander Ramsey immediately turned to 
former governor and friend, Henry Hastings Sibley, to gather a 
force to respond.51 After battles at Fort Ridgely, New Ulm, Birch 
Coulee, and other locations,52 on September 23, thirty-seven days 
after beginning the war, the Dakota forces were defeated at the 
Battle of Wood Lake.53 Soon thereafter, Taoyateduta and at least 
150 Dakota fled to the western prairies, where they knew they could 
not be pursued until the spring.54 
Taoyateduta’s exit left a path open for those Dakota who had 
opposed the war from its inception. On September 26, these so-
called “friendly” Indians turned over 269 whites and mixed-bloods 
that had been held captive.55 Sibley took the remaining 1200–1800 
Dakota into custody at Camp Release.56 This number included 
some defeated warriors, women and children, and a large 
contingent of Dakota who had refused to join the war effort, some 
of whom had protected white refugees fleeing the hostilities.57 
Rather than treat the Dakota as prisoners of war, on 
September 28, 1862, Henry Sibley decided to convene a five-person 
military commission to try certain Dakota for “murder and 
outrages.”58 Sibley informed General Pope that he would summarily 
try those who had been involved in the war and if found guilty, he 
planned to immediately authorize their executions, even though he 
 
 51.  Letter from Governor Alexander Ramsey to Sec’y of War Edwin Stanton 
(Aug. 21, 1862), in 13 WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, supra note 2, at 590; Message 
of Governor Ramsey to the Legislature of Minnesota (Sept. 9, 1862), in 1862 MINN. 
EXEC. DOCS., supra note 33, at 3, 5. 
 52.  See generally CARLEY, supra note 2 (containing accounts of the 1862 
battles). 
 53.  ANDERSON, KINSMEN, supra note 28, at 274; MEYER, supra note 34, at 123. 
Casualties were minimal in the Battle of Wood Lake. Sibley lost four men, and the 
Dakota lost between sixteen and thirty men. But much of the Dakota force refused 
to fight, making the end of the conflict obvious to Taoyateduta and the other 
leaders. ANDERSON, KINSMEN, supra note 28, at 274; Letter from Brigadier-Gen. 
Henry Sibley to Maj.-Gen. John Pope (Oct. 17, 1862), in 13 WAR OF THE REBELLION, 
SER. I, supra note 2, at 745; Report of Colonel Henry Sibley (Sept. 23, 1862), in 
13 WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, supra note 2, at 279. 
 54.  ANDERSON, KINSMEN, supra note 28, at 275, 278; MEYER, supra note 34, 
at 123. 
 55.  MEYER, supra note 34, at 123. 
 56.  ANDERSON, KINSMEN, supra note 28, at 276. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Letter from Colonel Henry Sibley to Maj.-Gen. John Pope (Sept. 28, 
1862), in 13 WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, supra note 2, at 686–87; Letter from 
Brigadier-Gen. Henry Sibley to Maj.-Gen. John Pope (Oct. 3, 1862), in 13 WAR OF 
THE REBELLION, SER. I, supra note 2, at 707–08. 
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was unsure he had the legal authority to do so.59 The 
commissioners Sibley appointed were military officers that had 
each fought against the Dakota just days earlier, but were now 
expected to dispense impartial justice.60 The commission decided 
thirty to forty cases in a single day and some were heard in as little 
as five minutes.61 None of the Dakota were provided attorneys, 
hearsay evidence was used against them, and many were prevented 
from testifying in their own defense.62 No distinction was made 
between those Dakota who had fought soldiers in battle and those 
who had killed civilians. 
By November 5, 1862, the military commission had tried 392 
Indians for “crimes” connected to the war, convicted 323 men, and 
condemned 303 of those men to death.63 Henry Sibley informed 
General Pope that he expected to approve the results and, with 
Pope’s permission, “hang the villains.” But the Militia Act of 1862 
provided that no execution could take place without the 
President’s approval.64 As a result, General Pope telegraphed the 
list of condemned men to President Lincoln on November 7, 1862. 
After receiving the telegram listing the 303 Dakota men who 
had been condemned to death, President Lincoln directed General 
Pope to forward “the full and complete record of their convictions” 
by mail.65 Lincoln then struggled to find a solution that would 
 
 59.  Letter from Colonel Henry Sibley to Maj.-Gen. John Pope, supra note 58, 
at 686–87. 
 60.  2 FOLWELL, supra note 7, at 191, 192 n.3; WINGERD, supra note 3, at 313. 
 61.  Carol Chomsky, The United States Dakota War Trials: A Study in Military 
Injustice, 43 STAN. L. REV. 13, 27, 47 (1990); see also NICHOLS, supra note 23, at 95, 
99–100 (noting that the average length of a trial was only ten to fifteen minutes). 
 62.  NICHOLS, supra note 23, at 99–100. In one case, the only testimony taken 
was a lone witness who stated: “I saw the prisoner . . . and he stated to me that he 
was wounded at the Fort, and that he there fired one shot.” Id. at 100. The 
prisoner was not allowed to speak in his own defense, and he was immediately 
sentenced to death. Id. 
 63.  There are small discrepancies among scholars in the final tally of those 
convicted and acquitted by the commission. Compare Chomsky, supra note 61, at 28 
(noting that of the 392 men tried, the commission acquitted 69 and convicted 323, 
of which 303 were sentenced to death and 20 to imprisonment), with 2 FOLWELL, 
supra note 7, at 196 (claiming, after a complete review of the record, that 392 
persons were tried, 70 were acquitted or not proven, 16 were sentenced to 
imprisonment, and 307 were sentenced to death). 
 64.  Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 201, § 5, 12 Stat. 597, 598 (“And no sentence of 
death, or imprisonment in the penitentiary, shall be carried into execution until 
the same shall have been approved by the President.”). 
 65.  Letter from President Abraham Lincoln to Major-Gen. John Pope (Nov. 
10, 1862), in 13 WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, supra note 2, at 787. 
 
2013] MINNESOTA BOUNTIES DURING U.S.-DAKOTA WAR 11 
temper the draconian sentences Sibley and Pope wished to impose, 
be severe enough to discourage another war, satisfy Minnesotans’ 
calls for revenge, and not risk losing his supporters in what was a 
key northern state.66 Initially, Lincoln planned to execute only 
those found guilty of rape, but he discovered there were only two 
such cases.67 He then added the names of those who were believed 
to have engaged in the killing of civilians rather than battles with 
soldiers.68 On December 6, 1862, President Lincoln personally 
wrote out the names of thirty-nine Dakota men to be executed.69 
He ordered the remaining Dakota be held until further 
instructions were received.70 
On December 26, 1862, before a crowd of some 4000 people, 
the prisoners walked to the great wooden gallows specially 
constructed just a few days earlier so that all thirty-eight men (one 
of the men on Lincoln’s list received a last minute reprieve) would 
die simultaneously.71 The prisoners wore white muslin coverings 
and sang a traditional Dakota song as they were led to gallows. 
Ropes were placed around their necks, and a single blow from an 
ax cut the rope that held the platform causing the prisoners to fall 
to their deaths. This was the largest mass execution in American 
history.72 
In February 1863, at the urging of Governor Ramsey and the 
Minnesota Legislature,73 Congress passed an act unilaterally 
abrogating all treaties between the United States and the 
Minnesota Dakota, confiscating their lands, and cancelling their 
 
 66.  See, e.g., Letter from Governor Alexander Ramsey to President Abraham 
Lincoln (Nov. 10, 1862), in 13 WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, supra note 2, at 787 
(“I hope the execution of every Sioux Indian condemned by the military court will 
at once be ordered.”); NICHOLS, supra note 23, at 100–03, 106–11; Paul Finkelman, 
“I Could Not Afford to Hang Men for Votes.” Lincoln the Lawyer, Humanitarian Concerns, 
and the Dakota Pardons, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 405, 408, 412 (2013). 
 67.  2 FOLWELL, supra note 7, at 209; NICHOLS, supra note 23, at 112. 
 68.  2 FOLWELL, supra note 7, at 209; NICHOLS, supra note 23, at 100, 112. 
 69.  2 FOLWELL, supra note 7, at 209; Letter from President Abraham Lincoln 
to Brigadier-Gen. Henry Sibley (Dec. 6, 1862) (on file with the Minnesota 
Historical Society). 
 70.  Letter from President Abraham Lincoln to Brigadier-Gen. Henry Sibley, 
supra note 69. 
 71.  DAHLIN, DAKOTA UPRISING, supra note 2, at 255; see ANDERSON, KINSMEN, 
supra note 28, at 277; NICHOLS, supra note 23, at 117. 
 72.  NICHOLS, supra note 23, at 117. 
 73.  2 FOLWELL, supra note 7, at 245; NICHOLS, supra note 23, at 96–97; 
Message of Governor Ramsey to the Legislature of Minnesota, supra note 51, at 11. 
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annuity payments.74 Less than one month later, Congress passed an 
act removing the Dakota from Minnesota and authorizing the 
President to assign them a reservation “outside of the limits of any 
state.”75 Nearly 2000 Minnesota Winnebagos who had taken no part 
in the Dakota War were also forced to leave.76 
In April 1863, President Lincoln decided that no more 
executions would take place, and he ordered the convicted Dakota 
to serve indefinite prison terms in a camp near Davenport, Iowa.77 
For the rest of the Dakota, he approved their removal to the site of 
a new reservation on the Missouri River in what would become 
South Dakota.78 By this time, at least 200 Dakota had died while at 
the Fort Snelling internment camp due to the harsh winter, lack of 
food, and disease.79 Over the next month, as they traveled to the 
Crow Creek Reservation, they left a trail of makeshift graves along 
the riverbank, dug for passengers who had fallen ill and perished 
along the trip.80 Three hundred more died on this trip, as a result 
of what Missionary Thomas Williamson likened to the slaves’ 
“middle passage.”81 
B. Dakota Raids in the Spring of 1863 
In the winter of 1863, General Pope and Henry Sibley began to 
plan an expedition to chase down the Dakota who had fled west 
with Taoyateduta following the Battle of Wood Lake. Pope 
instructed Sibley that when the spring came and he was preparing 
 
 74.  Act of Feb. 16, 1863, ch. 37, 12 Stat. 652, 652–54 (1863); 2 FOLWELL, supra 
note 7, at 246–48; see also Howard J. Vogel, Rethinking the Effect of the Abrogation of the 
Dakota Treaties and the Authority for the Removal of the Dakota People from Their 
Homeland, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 538, 559–78 (2013) (discussing Congress’s 
ability to unilaterally abrogate the Dakota treaties). 
 75.  Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 112 Stat. 819, 819–20 (1863).  
 76.  NICHOLS, supra note 23, at 115–16, 121–22. 
 77.  2 FOLWELL, supra note 7, at 262; NICHOLS, supra note 23, at 124–25. 
The prisoners were eventually pardoned by President Johnson in April 1866. 
2 FOLWELL, supra note 7, at 262. More than 100 died in prison before they were 
released. Id.  
 78.  2 FOLWELL, supra note 7, at 258. 
 79.  CORINNE L. MONJEAU-MARZ, THE DAKOTA INDIAN INTERNMENT AT FORT 
SNELLING, 1862–1864, at 61, 165 (2005). But see ANDERSON, KINSMEN, supra note 28, 
at 278 (claiming that nearly half of the Dakota died at the Fort Snelling 
internment camp). 
 80.  2 FOLWELL, supra note 7, at 259. 
 81.  Id.; MEYER, supra note 34, at 146, 147–48. Hundreds more died shortly 
after being relocated to the Crow Creek Reservation because the United States 
failed to provide adequate food and clothing. MEYER, supra note 34, at 147–48. 
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to leave the state, it was not “necessary or desirable that you should 
keep up the small posts you have established for the winter along 
the frontier. Don’t put yourself on the defensive, but on the 
offensive.”82 
Governor Ramsey disagreed. As if anticipating General Pope’s 
instructions, the governor sent Sibley a letter several days earlier, 
requesting that he maintain a military presence in the state.83 
The governor claimed there was “a deep anxiety throughout the 
frontier settlements” because it was believed that Dakota attacks 
would begin anew in the spring.84 He argued that “with five 
regiments of infantry and one of mounted rangers at your disposal, 
you will be able to proceed across the plains and chastise the Sioux 
allies of [Taoyateduta] and at the same time guard our extended 
settlements from any reasonable probability of an inroad from 
Sioux or other Indians.”85 
Sibley replied in a letter dated February 14, 1863.86 He told 
Governor Ramsey that he had already issued an order commanding 
officers along the frontier to construct stockades where settlers 
could flee in case of attack.87 Scouts would be employed so they 
could sound the alarm if Dakota were seen approaching the 
settlements. On the other hand, Sibley pointed out that he did not 
know the size of the force that he would have at his disposal for the 
expedition to the Dakota Territory; therefore, he did not commit 
to leaving any troops to protect settlers in Minnesota. Instead, he 
suggested that companies of militia be formed that could defend 
their hometowns, if necessary. Sibley believed that these militia 
groups would “prevent a panic and tend to appease the 
apprehensions of the people generally,” but he did not think they 
 
 82.  Letter from Major-Gen. John Pope to Brigadier-Gen. Henry Sibley (Feb. 
25, 1863), in 22 U.S. DEP’T OF WAR, WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, PART II 123, 123 
(1888). 
 83.  Letter from Governor Alexander Ramsey to Brigadier-Gen. Henry Sibley 
(Feb. 13, 1863), in 2 MINNESOTA IN THE CIVIL AND INDIAN WARS 292, 292–93 (1899). 
 84.  Id. at 292. 
 85.  Letter from Brigadier-Gen. Henry Sibley to Governor Alexander Ramsey 
(Feb. 14, 1863), in 2 MINNESOTA IN THE CIVIL AND INDIAN WARS, supra note 83, 
at 293.  
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. at 294; see also Willoughby M. Babcock, Minnesota’s Frontier: A Neglected 
Sector of the Civil War, MINN. HISTORY, June 1963, at 274, 280 (quoting a February 
1863 circular instructing commanding officers “to construct a bullet proof 
stockade at least nine feet high which [will] serve not only for defense, but as a 
place of refuge to families in the neighborhood in case of attack by Indians”). 
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would be necessary.88 “My own belief is that the hostile Indians will 
make no descent upon the border until they find they are not 
themselves to be attacked in their prairie haunts.”89 
As it turns out, Sibley’s confidence was misplaced. While most 
of the Dakota had been expelled from the state of Minnesota,90 a 
few returned in the spring of 1863 and continued raids on 
Minnesota settlers. In mid-April, a group of Dakota went on an 
expedition to the south branch of the Watonwan River (just west of 
Madelia, Minnesota) to acquire horses.91 They traveled to a nearby 
home that was being temporarily occupied by two members of 
Company E, Seventh Minnesota Volunteer Regiment.92 The Dakota 
attacked the occupants, killing a soldier, and wounding another 
soldier and a civilian.93 The survivors fled to a nearby stockade, 
known as Fort Union, where the other members of Company E 
were located.94 
Upon learning of the attack, Lieutenant Hardy sent soldiers to 
collect nearby settlers and bring them to the stockade where they 
could be more easily protected.95 In that vein, two soldiers were 
sent to the nearby home of Swenson Roland.96 But while escorting 
the Roland family to the stockade, the soldiers spotted a group of 
Dakota and left the family to pursue them.97 The Rolands were 
attacked not long afterward. Their twelve-year-old son was killed 
 
 88.  2 MINNESOTA IN THE CIVIL AND INDIAN WARS, supra note 83, at 294. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing those Dakota who 
were permitted to remain within the state). 
 91.  CHARLES S. BRYANT & ABEL B. MURCH, A HISTORY OF THE GREAT MASSACRE 
BY THE SIOUX INDIANS IN MINNESOTA 487 (1872); The Indian Campaign Opened. 
Midnight Attack on an Outpost. Several Persons Killed and Wounded. Several Horses 
Stolen, ST. PAUL DAILY PRESS, Apr. 19, 1863 [hereinafter The Indian Campaign 
Opened]. 
 92.  BRYANT & MURCH, supra note 91, at 487; Further Particulars of the Indian 
Attack on Fort Cox on the Watonwan, ST. PAUL DAILY PRESS, Apr. 21, 1863 [hereinafter 
Further Particulars of the Indian Attack]. 
 93.  BRYANT & MURCH, supra note 91, at 487; 2 FOLWELL, supra note 7, at 281; 
THOMAS HUGHES, HISTORY OF BLUE EARTH COUNTY AND BIOGRAPHIES OF ITS LEADING 
CITIZENS 140 (1909); Narrative of the Seventh Regiment, in 1 MINNESOTA IN THE 
CIVIL AND INDIAN WARS 347, 353 (1890); The Indian Campaign Opened, supra note 91. 
The soldier killed was named Ole Boxrud, but he was sometimes referred to as Ole 
Erickson. DAHLIN, GRAVESTONES, supra note 18, at 94, 128; HUGHES, supra; Further 
Particulars of the Indian Attack, supra note 92. 
 94.  BRYANT & MURCH, supra note 91, at 487. 
 95.  Id.; Further Particulars of the Indian Attack, supra note 92. 
 96.  BRYANT & MURCH, supra note 91, at 487. 
 97.  Id. 
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and three family members were wounded.98 That same day, three 
civilians fishing and trapping within a few miles of Fort Union were 
also killed, presumably by Dakota.99 Colonel Miller,100 commanding 
at Mankato, dispatched two companies under Lieutenant Colonel 
William Marshall to give chase, but they were unable to overtake 
the Dakota party.101 
Initial reports claimed that more than fifty Dakota warriors led 
the attacks.102 Brigadier General Sibley quickly attempted to 
counter this misinformation by notifying the press that probably 
only a handful of Dakota were involved.103 Sibley’s supposition was 
later confirmed by Lieutenant Colonel Marshall, who could only 
identify the tracks of six individuals while in pursuit of the Dakota 
party.104 Yet despite this, the press continued to publish the fanciful 
 
 98.  Id. at 486–88; see also BRYANT & MURCH, supra note 91, at 486–88 (noting 
that Swenson Roland’s son, Christ, was killed); HUGHES, supra note 93, at 140 
(stating that a twelve-year old boy was killed, but wrongly identifying him as 
Christopher Gilbrantson); MARION P. SATTERLEE, AUTHENTIC LIST OF THE VICTIMS 
OF THE INDIAN MASSACRE AND WAR 1862 TO 1865, at 7 (1919) (listing Christian 
Roland as having been killed in Watonwan County). 
 99.  The other civilians killed were Gilbert Palmer, Ole Palmer, and Gabriel 
Ellingson. See BRYANT & MURCH, supra note 91, at 488; HUGHES, supra note 93, 
at 140 (listing the dead as Gilbrand Palmer, Gabriel Erlingren and Ole 
Palmerson); C. M. OEHLER, THE GREAT SIOUX UPRISING 228–29 (1959) (Gilbert 
Parker); SATTERLEE, supra note 98, at 7 (listing the dead as Gabriel Ellingson, 
Gilbert Palmer, and Ole Palmer). 
 100.  The Colonel Miller referred to was Colonel Stephen Miller. Just a few 
months later, he was elected governor of Minnesota. He remained in that office 
until January 1866. P. J. SEBERGER & STEPHEN MILLER, STEPHEN MILLER—MOST 
FAMOUS OF ST. CLOUD’S EARLY PIONEERS; HIS LIFE, HIS WORK, HIS SWORD 6–7 
(1933). 
 101.  CLODFELTER, supra note 6, at 71 (1998); 1 MINNESOTA IN THE CIVIL AND 
INDIAN WARS, supra note 93, at 353; John Danielson, HISTORY OF COMPANY G, OF THE 
7TH MINNESOTA VOLUNTEERS, WAR OF THE REBELLION, AUGUST 12, 1862 TO AUGUST 
16, 1865, at 2 (undated) (on file with the Minnesota Historical Society) (combined 
diaries of brothers H.H. Danielson and John Danielson, members of Company G 
of the 7th Minnesota Volunteers states “Apr. 17 Friday. Indian raid on South 
Branch stations on Watonwan reported. Cos. G. and K march to Madelia Station. 
Lt. Col. Marshall commanding. Quit at Fort Cox”). 
 102.  The Indian Campaign Opened, supra note 91 (“[T]he attacking party were 
estimated at fifty in number. . . .”); The Sioux War! The Ball Opened. Soldiers Attacked 
by Indians Near Madelia, MANKATO INDEP., Apr. 17, 1863 (claiming that the attack 
was initiated “by a force of Indians estimated at from fifty to one hundred”). 
 103.  Letter from Brigadier-Gen. Henry Sibley to St. Paul Press (Apr. 18, 1863), 
reprinted in ST. PAUL DAILY PRESS, Apr. 19, 1863. 
 104.  Letter from Lieutenant Colonel William R. Marshall to Colonel Stephen 
Miller (Apr. 22, 1863), reprinted in ST. PAUL DAILY PRESS, Apr. 25, 1863. 
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claim that dozens of warriors were involved, which created hysteria 
among settlers in the area.105 
On May 4, 1863, Lieutenant Governor Henry Swift wrote to 
Governor Ramsey to inform him of the Madelia attacks.106 He noted 
that many settlers had left the area due to fear of future Indian 
attacks. Swift claimed that Minnesota Adjutant General Oscar 
Malmros was refusing to send arms to the area because Nicollet, 
Brown, and Renville counties had given the state “trouble in the 
past.” He asked that Governor Ramsey intervene and ensure that 
arms were distributed to settlers in these border areas.107 
Governor Ramsey adopted Swift’s suggestions. He directed the 
Minnesota Adjutant General to place Brigadier General Munch on 
special duty.108 Munch was to visit the counties of Nicollet, Blue 
Earth, Brown, and Renville to determine whether Indian raids were 
likely there and, if so, whether citizens in those counties were 
prepared to repel the attacks.109 Munch was given access to the 
state’s cache of weapons and ammunition and instructed to 
distribute them to militia companies in those areas most likely to be 
attacked.110 About two weeks later, Munch was directed to expand 
his activities to Sibley, McLeod, Meeker, and Stearns counties.111 
Unfortunately, more deaths occurred around the same time 
that Munch was receiving his orders. In early May, three soldiers 
 
 105.  See, e.g., Further Particulars of the Indian Attack, supra note 92 (reprinting an 
April 17, 1863, report from Captain Hall of the Seventh Regiment claiming that 
there were “not less than fifty” Dakota involved in the attack); Letter from Captain 
Hall, Co. E, Seventh Minn. Volunteers, to Colonel Stephen Miller (Apr. 21, 1863) 
reprinted in ST. PAUL DAILY PRESS, Apr. 25, 1863 (reprinting another statement of 
Captain Hall claiming that “there must have been forty or fifty of the party of 
Indians”). 
 106.  Letter from Henry Swift, Lieutenant Governor, to Alexander Ramsey, 
Governor (May 4, 1863), microformed on Ramsey Papers, roll 14, frame 223–26 (on 
file with the Minnesota Historical Society) (“[H]ostile Indians have made an attack 
on the Watonwan, have stolen property, and killed at least one settler near the 
mouth of the Cottonwood . . . .”). 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Letter from Minn. Adjutant-Gen. Oscar Malmros to Brigadier-Gen. 
Munch (May 7, 1863), in Emil Munch Papers (on file with the Minnesota 
Historical Society). 
 109.  ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, supra note 11, at 212 (Special 
Orders No. 15). 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Preparations for the Defense of the Frontier, ST. PAUL DAILY PRESS, June 7, 1863 
(describing Munch’s activities); Letter from Minn. Adjutant-Gen. Oscar Malmros 
to Brigadier-Gen. Munch (May 27, 1863), in Emil Munch Papers (on file with the 
Minnesota Historical Society). 
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and one civilian were killed on the Abercrombie trail in the vicinity 
of Fort Pomme de Terre.112 Then, on May 19, 1863, Henry Basche113 
was shot and killed about two miles outside of the town of New 
Ulm, by a party of Dakota intent on stealing the horses Basche was 
using to plow his field.114 Basche’s six-year-old son escaped and ran 
to a neighbor’s home.115 The neighbor quickly traveled to New Ulm 
where a company of mounted rangers was based. The Rangers 
pursued but were unable to capture the Dakota responsible for the 
killing.116 
The Sheriff of Brown County sent Governor Ramsey a 
hysterical letter following Basche’s death, claiming that “Brown 
County is the most exposed part of the State being without 
protection!”117 Even though the mounted rangers were admittedly 
based in New Ulm, the Sheriff complained that few soldiers were 
stationed in other portions of Brown County. He requested 
additional troops be sent to create a protective line to the west of 
settlers. If troops were not forthcoming, the Sheriff claimed that he 
would have to press militia companies into active service at the 
expense of the state.118 
 
 112.  The names of those who were killed are Adam Hair, Zenas Blackman, 
Comfort Luddington, and Silas Foot. DAHLIN, GRAVESTONES, supra note 18, at 
78–79; More Indian Murders. Four Persons Killed near Fort Abercrombie. Two of the Bodies 
Still Missing, ST. PAUL DAILY PRESS, May 6, 1863; The Murders near Pomme de Terre. 
Names of the Killed and Full Particulars. Bullets, Buck-Shot and Arrows Were Used, 
ST. PAUL DAILY PRESS, May 13, 1863; see SATTERLEE, supra note 98, at 7, 8. These 
persons were likely killed by the same small group of Dakota responsible for the 
attacks on the Watonwan River since Lieutenant Colonel Marshall chased that 
group in a westward direction before giving up the pursuit. Letter from 
Lieutenant Colonel William R. Marshall to Colonel Stephen Miller, supra note 104 
(indicating that Marshall followed the Dakota west towards Big Stone Lake, which 
is 50 miles south of Pomme de Terre). 
 113.  His real name actually appears to have been Heinrich Bosche, but since 
Henry Basche is used in nearly all of the reports of the time, I have continued to 
do so. See DAHLIN, GRAVESTONES, supra note 18, at 65 (including photograph of 
gravestone). 
 114.  2 FOLWELL, supra note 7, at 281; On the Way to Camp Pope. Particulars of the 
Recent Indian Murder Near New Ulm. Proceedings of the Indemnity Commission of St. Peter, 
ST. PAUL DAILY PRESS, May 24, 1863; see Letter from George Jacobs, Sheriff of 
Brown County, to Alexander Ramsey, Governor (May 20, 1863), microformed on 
Ramsey Papers, roll 11A, frame 768 (on file with the Minnesota Historical Society). 
 115.  Letter from George Jacobs, Sheriff of Brown Cnty., to Alexander Ramsey, 
Governor (May 20, 1863), microformed on Ramsey Papers, roll 11A, frame 768 (on 
file with the Minnesota Historical Society). 
 116.  See id. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. 
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Governor Ramsey in turn wrote Henry Sibley. In a May 23, 
1863, letter, the governor informed Sibley of Basche’s death and 
noted that “this murder, with those at Madelia and those on 
Abercrombie trail, naturally cause alarm among the frontier 
settlers.”119 He asked Sibley for help,120 but was met with a rather 
curt response.121 Sibley had already heard about Basche’s death and 
claimed that there was nothing more he could do: 
While I deeply deplore these occasional raids, and have 
taken every precaution against them, it must be evident to 
you that along the line of frontier to be guarded it is 
physically impossible to protect every man on his farm by 
an armed force, or to prevent entirely the passage of two 
or three Indians at points where they may do mischief.122 
Sibley believed that the ultimate solution was still the expedition he 
was preparing to make into the Dakota Territory to “sweep[] the 
country of these merciless redskins.”123 Until that time, he once 
again suggested that every settler arm himself.124 
Ultimately, however, when Sibley left the state to pursue his 
expedition against the Dakota, he left approximately 1800 soldiers 
behind to defend frontier settlements in Minnesota.125 Both he and 
Brigadier General Munch had independently come to the 
conclusion that a chain of infantry posts located west of the 
settlements and approximately ten to fifteen miles apart should be 
maintained at all times. Cavalry were assigned to patrol between 
these posts to ensure steady communication.126 
 
 119.  Letter from Governor Alexander Ramsey to Brigadier-Gen. Henry Sibley 
(May 23, 1863), in 2 MINNESOTA IN THE CIVIL AND INDIAN WARS, supra note 83, 
at 296. 
 120.  Id. (“With some 5,000 troops in the state destined for this special 
purpose, I can but hope that [the necessity of ordering the militia to the western 
frontier] may be saved us. I should be pleased to hear from you as to what may be 
expected to be done, that I may communicate it to citizens on the frontier who 
have addressed me on the subject.”). 
 121.  Id. at 296–97. 
 122.  Id. at 297. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id.  
 125.  Babcock, supra note 87, at 283–84; Preparations for the Summer Campaign 
Against the Indians. The Disposition of the Troops Along the Frontier, MANTORVILLE 
EXPRESS, June 5, 1863 (noting that 1852 troops including all of the Eighth 
Regiment and several companies of the Ninth Regiment would remain in 
Minnesota). 
 126.  ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, supra note 11, at 340–41; 
Babcock, supra note 87, at 282, 283. 
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Despite these efforts, small parties of Dakota still managed to 
wreak havoc on border areas. On June 7, 1863, a party believed to 
consist of between four and six Dakota men127 apparently seized a 
number of horses near Silver Creek in Wright County.128 When 
trackers confirmed that the individuals responsible were Indians, 
Lieutenant Nathaniel Tibbetts, who had temporary command of a 
detachment from the Eighth Minnesota Regiment stationed at 
Kingston, started in pursuit.129 
The actual commanding officer for Company A was Captain 
John Cady. Cady had been in St. Paul to secure horses for his scouts 
and was on his way back to Kingston when the horse theft 
occurred.130 While en route, he passed through Forest City and was 
informed of Tibbetts’s pursuit of the Dakota. Cady hastily followed, 
and when he overtook Tibbetts, he resumed command of the 
soldiers.131 Captain Cady and his men followed the trail until they 
reached Kandiyohi Lake. As soon as they saw the Dakota, Cady and 
his men opened fire, apparently wounding at least one man.132 
The Dakota returned fire, however, and Captain Cady was shot 
through the heart and killed instantly.133 
While Captain Cady was just twenty-five years old and had only 
lived in Minnesota for a few years, he was well known and well 
respected both inside and outside the military.134 He owned a large 
amount of real estate and was a leading businessman.135 The details 
 
 127.  See The Indian War: Another Murder by the Savages, WINONA DAILY 
REPUBLICAN, June 16, 1863 [hereinafter The Indian War]. 
 128.  ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, supra note 11, at 341–42; The 
Sioux Raid in Wright and Meeker Counties. Full Particulars of the Pursuit. How Captain 
Cady Was Killed, ST. PAUL DAILY PRESS, June 14, 1863 [hereinafter The Sioux Raid]. 
 129.  Another Indian Outrage, MANTORVILLE EXPRESS, June 19, 1863; The Sioux 
Raid, supra note 128. 
 130.  Another Indian Murder! Captain Cady the Victim. He Was Shot Through the 
Head and Instantly Killed. The Indians Escaped, ST. PAUL DAILY PRESS, June 13, 1863 
[hereinafter Another Indian Murder!]; Indians in Meeker County, CHATFIELD 
DEMOCRAT, June 20, 1863. 
 131.  Another Indian Murder!, supra note 130; Indians in Meeker County, supra 
note 130. 
 132.  DAHLIN, GRAVESTONES, supra note 18, at 72; Another Indian Outrage, supra 
note 129; The Indian War, supra note 127. 
 133.  ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, supra note 11, at 341–42; 
Indians in Meeker County, supra note 130; The Sioux Raid, supra note 128. 
 134.  LOUIS H. RODDIS, THE INDIAN WARS OF MINNESOTA 223 (1956); Indians in 
Meeker Country. Capt. Cady of the Eighth Regiment Killed, ST. PAUL PIONEER (DAILY), 
June 13, 1863 [hereinafter Capt. Cady of the Eighth Regiment Killed].  
 135.  Jared Benson, Letter to the Editor, A Fuller Account Derived from an 
Eyewitness, ST. PAUL DAILY PRESS, June 14, 1863; see Capt. Cady of the Eighth Regiment 
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of his death were published in every major newspaper in 
Minnesota136 and helped to continue to fuel panic among settlers. 
Reports of stolen cattle, horses, and other personal property 
increased in Wright County toward the latter part of June. These 
reports were characterized as thefts by Dakota, although there is 
little evidence to support this claim.137 Then, the final straw 
occurred. On June 29, 1863, Amos Dustin, who had lived in Wright 
County for a number of years, was moving his family to a new piece 
of land in the southwestern part of the same county. He was 
traveling with his wife, their three children (a six-year-old girl and 
two sons, one four and the other two years old), and Dustin’s 
widowed mother along a road not far from Howard Lake when his 
wagon was attacked by Dakota. Dustin, his mother, and his four-
year-old son were killed quickly. Dustin’s wife was mortally 
wounded in the attack, and she died several days later. The other 
two children managed to escape and were rescued by settlers.138 
The attack was especially surprising because it occurred “in a 
comparatively thickly settled country” far from the frontier border 
and just forty miles west of the state capital.139 Additionally, the 
victim’s bodies laid exposed to the elements for two days before 
they were found, and the scene was especially grisly. Dustin’s left 
hand was cut off and carried away, as were both of his mother’s 
hands.140 One newspaper asked: “Can’t we get another expedition 
started out to hunt Indians?”141 
 
Killed, supra note 134; Particulars of the Death of Captain Cady, ST. ANTHONY FALLS, 
June 13, 1863. 
 136.  See Another Indian Murder. Captain Cady Killed, FAIRBAULT CENT. 
REPUBLICAN, June 17, 1863; Capt. Cady Killed, ST. CLOUD DEMOCRAT, June 18, 1863; 
newspaper articles cited in supra notes 127–30, 134–35. 
 137.  ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, supra note 11, at 343. 
 138.  Id. at 343–44; 2 FOLWELL, supra note 7, at 442–43. 
 139.  ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, supra note 11, at 344; 
RODDIS, supra note 134, at 223. 
 140.  The Indian War. A Horrible Scene on the Prairie. The Mutilated Bodies of the 
Dustin Family. Indian Camps in Hennepin County. A Party of Sioux Seen Within 6 Miles 
of Minneapolis. Volunteer Scouts for 60 Days Called Out. Twenty-Five Dollars Bounty for 
Sioux Scalps, ST. PAUL DAILY PRESS, July 7, 1863. 
 141.  A Horrible Scene!, FAIRBAULT CENT. REPUBLICAN, July 15, 1863. 
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II. MINNESOTA’S BOUNTY SYSTEM 
A. The Minnesota Adjutant General’s Bounty Orders 
Governor Ramsey learned about the Dustin family murders on 
Friday, July 3, 1863.142 While fewer than twenty civilians and military 
personnel were killed by Dakota raids in Minnesota during the 
spring and summer of 1863, the events of the previous fall were no 
doubt still fresh in the governor’s mind. Offering a monetary 
reward for the killing of Dakota men appears to have been 
Governor Ramsey’s idea. Ramsey’s daily journal establishes that he 
summoned Minnesota Adjutant General, Oscar Malmros, and 
directed him to issue an order placing a bounty on Dakota men. 
His journal entry for July 3–4 states: “Had the Adj. Genl. [issue] an 
order inviting the service of 50 skilled trappers and sharp shooters 
& $25 per scalp for scalps of male Sioux Inds.”143 
On July 4, 1863, Minnesota Adjutant General Oscar Malmros 
complied with Governor Ramsey’s request by issuing General 
Orders No. 41. The order explained its purpose as follows: 
The continued outrages of the Sioux Indians in the Big 
Woods, and in the rear of the U.S. out posts for the 
border defence, render it imperatively necessary that 
extraordinary measures should be adopted for the more 
complete protection of our frontier and the extirpation of 
the savage fiends who commit these outrages.144 
The order provided for the creation of a corps of scouts that would 
“scour the Big Woods” for Sioux men. The corps was to remain 
active for sixty days and be composed of a captain and forty to sixty 
men, who were to be divided into squads of five or more men 
under the command of their own leader.145 The scouts would be 
responsible for equipping and subsisting themselves, but they were 
 
 142.  Journal Entry of Governor Alexander Ramsey (July 3, 1863), microformed 
on Ramsey Papers, roll 39, frame 862 (on file with the Minnesota Historical 
Society) (noting that around midnight two messengers came to inform him that 
members of the Dustin family had been killed by the Dakota on June 29). 
 143.  Journal Entry of Governor Alexander Ramsey (July 4, 1863), microformed 
on Ramsey Papers, roll 39, frame 862 (on file with the Minnesota Historical 
Society) (showing the journal entry on the page marked Saturday, July 4, but it is 
possible the entry was the remainder of the entry from July 3).  
 144.  ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, supra note 11, at 192 (General 
Orders No. 41). 
 145.  Id. 
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to be paid $1.50 per day and an additional $25 for “each scalp of a 
male Sioux delivered to this office.”146 
Brigadier General Munch traveled to different areas of the 
state to muster squads of volunteers into service and found an 
overwhelming response to General Orders No. 41. By July 24, 1863, 
the entire number of troops sought had been mustered in.147 James 
Sturges of Wright County was appointed captain of the company of 
scouts. In that position, he was responsible for directing and 
coordinating the movements of the several squads the scouts had 
been divided into.148 
General Orders No. 41 was reprinted and summarized in 
newspapers around the State of Minnesota.149 For the most part, the 
order was lauded by local newspapers. The St. Cloud Democrat, for 
example, stated that General Orders No. 41 was “the most effective 
plan that has yet been taken to clear the State of the marauding 
devils and this corps will do more service than any monster 
expedition moving at its snail like pace.”150 Not all of the features of 
the order, however, met with widespread approval. Many felt the 
provision requiring scalps be taken and presented to the Minnesota 
Adjutant General was barbaric.151 Other newspapers objected to the 
 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id. at 214 (Special Orders No. 38); id. at 346; id. at 196–97 (notifying the 
public in General Orders No. 45 that the company of scouts was now filled and no 
more persons would be accepted for service). 
 148.  Id. at 346.  
 149.  General Headquarters, State of Minnesota, ST. PAUL DAILY PRESS, July 8, 1863; 
General Orders No. 41, CHATFIELD DEMOCRAT, July 18, 1863; General Orders No. 41, 
ST. PAUL PIONEER & DEMOCRAT (WEEKLY), July 10, 1863; Scouts Wanted! $25 for Sioux 
Scalps! ST. CLOUD DEMOCRAT, July 9, 1863; The Indian War, WINONA DAILY 
REPUBLICAN, July 9, 1863; The Indians, MANTORVILLE EXPRESS, July 10, 1863; 
Untitled, ST. PAUL PIONEER (DAILY), July 7, 1863. 
 150.  Scouts Wanted! $25 for Sioux Scalps!, supra note 149. 
 151.  For example, the Winona Republican published the following editorial in 
response to General Orders No. 41: 
The offer of a bounty by Adjutant General Malmros of $25 for every 
Sioux scalp delivered to him at his office in St. Paul, appears to us 
peculiarly barbarous, and unworthy of him as well as disgraceful to the 
State. No greater incentive to capture and slay the Sioux can possibly 
be given than that already before our people. It is a mockery and a 
shame that such an idea as this of a bounty for scalps should be even 
momentarily entertained, to say nothing of its being seriously adopted 
and acted upon. In the name of our common humanity, and for the 
sake of that reputation for enlightenment which our State claims, we 
protest against the bounty feature of Gen. Molmros’ [sic] policy, and 
call upon the Executive to put an immediate stop to it. 
Bounty for Sioux Scalps, ST. PAUL PIONEER (DAILY), July 16, 1863 (reprinted from the 
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fact that the order allowed any Dakota male to be killed, regardless 
of whether he was a child or whether he had protected white 
settlers during the Dakota War. The Chatfield Democrat stated: 
Barbarism.— . . . Adjutant General Malmros, has 
issued an order offering a bounty of twenty five dollars for 
the scalp of any male Sioux. We look upon this 
proposition as a relic of the dark ages, barbarous, 
inhumane and unbecoming the enlightened age in which 
we live. . . . We have no objection to urge against killing 
the red devils who are guilty, but let the fair name of our 
State never be disgraced by paying a bounty to murder 
innocent children, even if they are Indians. God has made 
them what they are, and we have no right to take their 
lives unless forfeited by some act of their own. We hope 
the new Commander-in-Chief will at once revoke this 
disgraceful and objectionable portion of Order No. 41.152 
Henry Swift, who had recently taken over the governorship 
due to Alexander Ramsey’s election to the U.S. Senate, was 
apparently affected by public opinion. At his direction,153 on July 
20, 1863, Malmros issued General Orders No. 44, which amended 
the original bounty order. It limited application of the order to 
“hostile” Sioux warriors, rather than all Dakota men. Additionally, 
individuals seeking to claim the bounty were no longer required to 
provide a scalp. Instead, the order now stated that “satisfactory 
proof[s]” must be made at the Minnesota Adjutant General’s office 
to substantiate the killing.154 
 
WINONA REPUBLICAN and characterized as a “copperhead” editorial). 
 152.  Barbarism, CHATFIELD DEMOCRAT, July 18, 1863. 
 153.  News of Our Own State, ROCHESTER REPUBLICAN, July 29, 1863 (noting that 
the scalp bounty “had a blood thirsty look—it merged too clearly on the 
barbarous—and when Gov. Swift discovered this to be the fact, he ‘modified’ the 
policy of the Adjutant-Gen. Malmros . . . .”); see also The Indian Expedition, 
BURLINGTON HAWK EYE, July 25, 1863 (“The scalp bounty order . . . was issued 
during the interim between Gov. Ramsey’s resignation and the arrival of Gov. 
Swift, so that we were virtually without a Governor. [Now that the order has been 
revoked, our] Eastern friends will therefore find their comments of barbarism 
unnecessary.”). 
 154.  ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, supra note 11, at 195–96 
(General Orders No. 44). This later provision—eliminating the requirement that 
scalps be provided to the Minnesota Adjutant General—was mocked by many 
Minnesotans. The St. Cloud Democrat noted that “the Adjutant General, in order to 
free himself of the clamor that some thin-skinned folks are making, leaves it 
optional with scouts whether they bring him the scalp or the entire Indian. Rather 
a dry joke from headquarters!” New Features, ST. CLOUD DEMOCRAT, July 23, 1863. 
It was favorably received by those out of state, however. For example, Wisconsin 
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General Orders No. 44 also contained a new provision. 
Citizens who were not mustered in as scouts (entitling them to daily 
pay) were now able to collect a reward of $75 for killing any 
“hostile Sioux warrior.”155 To collect such a reward, these 
“independent scouts” were required to register in advance with the 
Minnesota Adjutant General’s office. On the other hand, 
individuals actually mustered into the formal scout corps saw their 
pay increased to $2 per day and they were still paid $25 per hostile 
Dakota killed.156 These new provisions were once again advertised 
statewide.157 
On September 20, 1863, the service period for volunteer 
scouts ended.158 The scouts were paid and disbanded. To ensure 
that there were still adequate numbers of persons willing to search 
for and kill hostile Dakota men, the Minnesota Adjutant General 
issued one final order. General Orders No. 60 increased the bounty 
for independent scouts from $75 to $200. The Winona Daily 
Republican claimed that “[t]his sum is more than the dead bodies 
of all the Indians east of the Red River are worth.”159 
B. Implementation of the Minnesota Adjutant General’s Orders and 
Payments Made 
Four individuals ultimately collected bounties under General 
Orders Nos. 41, 44, and 60 for killing Dakota men. They were paid 
a total of $325 out of the State’s Military Contingency Fund, and 
those payments are catalogued in the State Auditor’s Warrant 
Register, the Annual Report of the Minnesota Adjutant General, 
and the Annual Report of the State Auditor. The official records, 
however, do not include any factual descriptions of these killings. 
 
newspapers emphasized that now only testimony of the killing of a Dakota male 
was required for payment of the bounty, not his scalp. Revoking the scalp bounty 
was “extraordinary evidence that there is a gleam of civilization left somewhere on 
the continent.” Untitled, DAILY MILWAUKEE NEWS, July 23, 1863. 
 155.  ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, supra note 11, at 196 (General 
Orders No. 44). 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  General Headquarters, State of Minnesota, ST. PAUL DAILY PRESS, July 21, 
1863; General Orders No. 44, ST. PAUL PIONEER (DAILY), July 24, 1863; The Indians, 
CHATFIELD DEMOCRAT, Aug. 1, 1863; Untitled, ROCHESTER REPUBLICAN, Aug. 5, 
1863. 
 158.  ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, supra note 11, at 217 (Special 
Orders No. 103). 
 159.  Id. at 198 (General Orders No. 60); Untitled, WINONA DAILY REPUBLICAN, 
Sept. 25, 1863. 
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In an attempt to determine the surrounding circumstances, 
I began by reviewing newspaper articles during the relevant time 
periods and then attempted to corroborate the details contained in 
those articles through other sources. What follows is the first 
discussion of the circumstances surrounding the four bounty 
payments made by the Minnesota Adjutant General. 
The first bounty payment was made on July 6, 1863, to an 
individual referred to in State records as “J. H. Bates,”160 “Jas. H. 
Bates,”161 and “G. H. Bates.”162 On July 7, 1863, the St. Paul Pioneer 
notified its readers that J. W. Bates, Sheriff of McLeod County, had 
visited St. Paul with an Indian scalp in hand seeking the “authority 
to raise a company of Indian hunters.”163 He only discovered the 
recent issuance of General Orders No. 41, which already 
authorized the establishment of a corps of paid scouts to kill 
Dakota men, upon reaching the city. But Bates happily collected 
the $25 prize nonetheless.164 The story that follows is the one he 
apparently told newspaper reporters while he was in St. Paul. 
On July 4, 1863, a man named Harper was out in the woods 
with his son a few miles north of Hutchinson.165 They came upon 
three Indians who were picking berries.166 Harper fired his gun and 
hit one of the Indians in the hip.167 The Indians returned fire, and 
there are conflicting accounts as to whether Harper was injured or 
not in the return fire.168 Ultimately, however, the wounded Indian 
rose and Harper fired again, this time hitting him in the heart.169 
Harper succeeded in making his escape through the brush to Fort 
 
 160.  Minn. Office of the State Auditor, Warrant Register (July 6, 1863) (on file 
with the Minnesota Historical Society, restricted archives collection) (J.H. Bates). 
 161.  ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, supra note 11, at 223 (listing 
“Jas. H. Bates” as having been paid $25 on July 6, 1863, and including the 
description: “Bounty for Scalp”).  
 162.  ANNUAL REPORT OF THE STATE AUDITOR, reprinted in 1863 MINN. EXEC. 
DOCS., supra note 11, at 405, 470 (listing July 6th as the date $25 was paid “[t]o 
G. H. Bates, bounty for Sioux warrior scalp”). 
 163.  Indian Killed Near Hutchinson, ST. PAUL PIONEER, July 7, 1863. 
 164.  The Indian War, supra note 149; An Indian Killed, FAIRBAULT CENT. 
REPUBLICAN, July 15, 1863. 
 165.  Indian Killed Near Hutchinson, supra note 163; The Indian War, supra note 
149. 
 166.  Indian Killed Near Hutchinson, supra note 163. 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Compare Indian Killed Near Hutchinson, supra note 163 (noting that 
because Harper was shielded by a tree, he was not harmed), with An Indian Killed, 
supra note 164 (noting that the white settler made “his escape with a severe wound 
from their [Indian] fire”). 
 169.  Indian Killed Near Hutchinson, supra note 163. 
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Hooker or Glencoe (depending on the account), where the cavalry 
started in pursuit of the Indians, but to no avail. They did, however, 
find the body of the dead Indian, and they took his scalp.170 
It was fairly simple to determine that at the time, a J. W. Bates 
was indeed the Sheriff of McLeod County. He had only assumed 
that post in April 1863 due to the untimely death of the prior 
sheriff.171 Previously, the 1860 census establishes that Joseph W. 
Bates resided in Glencoe (within McLeod County) with his wife 
and two young children and worked as a “hotel keeper.”172 While 
the newspaper accounts and other sources help to confirm that 
Sheriff Joseph Bates is most likely the individual who collected the 
$25 bounty payment, they incorrectly report the person who was 
directly responsible for shooting the Dakota man. It was not a man 
named Harper, but rather, Lamson. And this was not just any 
Dakota man; it was Taoyateduta (Little Crow) himself. 
No other conclusion seems reasonable. There were no 
Harpers living in McLeod County at the time of the 1860 census, 
and no source other than these newspaper accounts refer to 
anyone by the name of Harper shooting a Dakota man in the 
summer of 1863.173 Conversely, Taoyateduta’s death is well 
documented. It occurred at the same approximate location and 
date. Most importantly, the circumstances surrounding the death 
of Taoyateduta closely parallel the facts that Sheriff Bates provided 
to these newspaper reporters. 
On July 3, 1863, Nathan Lamson was out hunting deer with his 
son, Chauncey, when they came upon two Dakota men picking 
raspberries a few miles north of Hutchinson in Meeker County.174 
Although the Lamsons did not know this at the time, the Dakota 
they saw were Taoyateduta and his teenage son, Wowinapa. 
 
 170.  An Indian Killed, supra note 164. 
 171.  HISTORY OF MCLEOD COUNTY MINNESOTA 231 (Franklyn Curtiss-Wedge & 
Return I. Holcombe eds., 1917) (stating that “J. W. Bates, of Glencoe, was duly 
appointed to fill the vacancy for the remainder of the term” of sheriff, on April 5, 
1863). 
 172.  Id. at 107. 
 173.  Id. at 81–108 (1860 census).  
 174.  Great Excitement in McLeod County. The Sioux Marauders in the Big Woods. A 
Peddler Chased by the Red Devils. Two Indians Surprised, and One Killed, by Mr. Lampson 
and His Son. How That Scalp Was Taken! Highly Interesting Details. Particulars of the 
Murder of James McGannon, ST. PAUL DAILY PRESS, July 10, 1863 [hereinafter Two 
Indians Surprised]; Walter Trenerry, The Shooting of Little Crow: Heroism or Murder?, 
MINN. HISTORY, Sept. 1962, at 150 [hereinafter Trenerry, The Shooting of Little 
Crow]. 
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Without warning or any attempt to determine if the men were 
hostile,175 Nathan Lamson immediately opened fire, striking 
Taoyateduta in the hip.176 Then, both sides fired a volley.177 Nathan 
Lamson was shot in the left shoulder, and Taoyateduta was shot 
fatally in the chest, this time by Chauncey.178 
Wowinapa remained with his father until he passed away.179 In 
accordance with Dakota traditions, Wowinapa then placed new 
moccasins on his father’s feet, covered his body in a blanket, 
straightened his legs, and left swiftly.180 Chauncey Lamson, 
believing that his father had also been killed, ran to the town of 
Hutchinson to sound the alarm.181 The next morning, a group of 
soldiers and civilians found Taoyateduta’s body, but they did not 
 
 175.  Two Indians Surprised, supra note 174 (subtitling the article section 
“Indians caught napping,” and discussing how Nathan Lamson crept undiscovered 
toward the Dakota men until he had a close and clean shot). While scholars 
frequently blame Taoyateduta for the attacks on Minnesota settlers and soldiers 
during the spring and early summer, there is no evidence that he was involved. 
Taoyateduta did not return to Minnesota until the middle of June 1863, which 
makes it impossible for him to have been involved in the deaths of Henry Basche, 
John Cady, and others killed in April, May, and early June. See MARK DIEDRICH, 
LITTLE CROW AND THE DAKOTA WAR 246 (2006). When he did return, he was 
traveling alone with his son, not with the group of six Dakota who killed the 
Dustin family. Id. The one death that Taoyateduta could have played a role in was 
that of James McGannon, a settler who was killed near Union Lake on the border 
of Wright and Meeker Counties on July 1, 1863. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADJUTANT 
GENERAL, supra note 11, at 345. At his death, Taoyateduta had McGannon’s jacket 
in his possession. Indian News and Rumors, ST. PETER TRIB., July 11, 1863. Wowinape 
later told military officials that they had returned to Minnesota only to gather 
horses and that the jacket was given to his father by Heyoka (also known as Hi-u-
ka), a relative of Taoyateduta’s through marriage, who had killed McGannon 
when they were traveling separately. Little Crow’s Death Confirmed, CHATFIELD 
DEMOCRAT, Aug. 22, 1863. It is possible that Wowinape fabricated this story in an 
attempt to absolve himself of any responsibility for McGannon’s death, but that 
seems unlikely given the consistent story that Wowinape told not only military 
officials, but other Dakota. See, e.g., Proceedings of a Military Commission Which 
Convened at Fort Abercrombie (Aug. 22, 1863), in U.S. ARMY, MILITARY COMM’N, SIOUX 
WAR TRIALS 1862 (1862) (testimony of Joseph Demairais) [hereinafter WOWINAPE’S 
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT]. But see DAHLIN, GRAVESTONES, supra note 18, at 77 (“McGannon 
was probably killed by Little Crow or the small party of Dakota who were with 
Little Crow.”). 
 176.  How that Indian Was Killed, ST. CLOUD DEMOCRAT, July 16, 1863. 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  RODDIS, supra note 134, at 226; WOWINAPE’S TRIAL TRANSCRIPT, supra note 
175 (testimony of William Quinn and Joseph Demaraist Jr.); Two Indians Surprised, 
supra note 174. 
 179.  Trenerry, The Shooting of Little Crow, supra note 174, at 150–51. 
 180.  Id. at 150; DIEDRICH, supra note 175, at 247. 
 181.  HISTORY OF MCLEOD COUNTY MINNESOTA, supra note 171, at 175. 
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recognize him as the famous chief.182 They scalped him and 
brought him back to town where his corpse was mutilated and 
displayed for the Fourth of July festivities.183 While the unique 
deformities on his arms and teeth made some townspersons 
question the man’s identity,184 it was not until Wowinapa was 
captured weeks later near what is now Devils Lake, North Dakota, 
that Taoyateduta’s death was confirmed.185 
This interpretation—that J.W. Bates was Sherriff Bates, who 
collected a $25 bounty for Taoyateduta’s scalp, not the scalp of 
some unknown Dakota—is also supported by other 
contemporaneous newspaper accounts. In August 1863, when it 
was finally confirmed that the Lamsons had killed Taoyateduta 
himself, several newspapers asserted that it was “poetic justice” that 
the first scalp upon which the bounty was claimed later turned out 
to be the chief himself.186 It also provides an explanation for how 
the scalp of Taoyateduta reached the Minnesota Adjutant General’s 
office, where it was preserved and decades later, provided to the 
Minnesota Historical Society.187 
Conversely, many prominent scholars have asserted that 
Chauncey Lamson himself brought Taoyateduta’s scalp to the 
Minnesota Adjutant General and claimed a $75 bounty payment for 
doing so.188 But neither the Annual Report of the Minnesota 
 
 182.  Trenerry, The Shooting of Little Crow, supra note 174, at 150–51. 
 183.  Id. For example, when the body of Taoyateduta arrived in Hutchinson on 
the Fourth of July, children filled the ears and nostrils with firecrackers. Little Crow, 
The Sioux Chief: How the Famous Warrior Met His Death. Historical Society Relics, 
microformed on Minnesota Historical Society Scrapbook, vol. 38, roll 13, frame 71. 
The body was buried in a shallow grave, but a cavalry officer who came to the town 
not long afterwards dug up the grave and cut off Taoyateduta’s head. Id. Dr. John 
Benjamin took the head home with him and placed it in a large dinner-pot filled 
with a solution of lime. The Body of Little Crow, HUTCHINSON LEADER, Jan. 6, 1893. 
In mid-August, the head was retrieved by Captain John W. Bond at the request of 
Colonel Stevens, who wanted to present it to the Minnesota Historical Society. 
Letter from Captain Bond to Colonel Miller (Aug. 16, 1863), reprinted in Little 
Crow. Exhumation of His Body. Letter from Capt. J. W. Bond, ST. PAUL PIONEER (DAILY), 
Aug. 20, 1863.  
 184.  See RODDIS, supra note 134, at 227. 
 185.  Id.  
 186.  See, e.g., Death of Little Crow Confirmed, HASTINGS CONSERVER, Aug. 18, 
1863; The Indian Expeditions—Death of Little Crow Confirmed, WINONA DAILY 
REPUBLICAN, Aug. 14, 1863. 
 187.  See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, supra note 11, at 225 
(entry for $5 payment on August 31 to a Julius Schmidt for “[t]anning Indian 
scalp”). 
 188.  See, e.g., ANDERSON, LITTLE CROW, supra note 1, at 8 (claiming that 
Taoyateduta was scalped because Nathan Lamson “wanted the trophy in order to 
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Adjutant General nor the Annual Report of the State Auditor show 
any payment being made to either Chauncey or Nathan Lamson in 
1863. This widely reported mistake appears to have come from 
errors in early newspaper accounts. For example, on July 16, 1863, 
long before anyone knew that the Dakota man killed was 
Taoyateduta, the St. Cloud Democrat stated that the Lamsons had 
claimed the bounty from the Minnesota Adjutant General’s 
office.189 The Lamsons corrected these inaccuracies when they were 
interviewed by reporters following the confirmation that the man 
they shot was indeed the famous chief.190 But that correction did 
not prevent the inaccuracy from proliferating.191 
In actuality, neither Sheriff Bates nor the Lamsons should have 
received a bounty payment from the Minnesota Adjutant General. 
Taoyateduta was shot the day before General Orders No. 41 was 
issued; regardless, only mustered-in members of the volunteer 
scouts were to receive bounty payments under that order.192 
No person with the surname of Bates, Harper, or Lamson is listed 
on the muster rolls for scouts included in the Adjutant General’s 
 
collect the seventy-five-dollars-a-head offered by the state for the scalps of hostile 
[Dakota],” even though that particular bounty order—General Orders No. 44—
was not issued until several weeks after the Chief’s death, and despite the fact that 
the Lamsons could not have even known about the first bounty order (General 
Orders No. 41), since it was issued the same day that Taoyateduta was killed); 
CARLEY, supra note 2, at 86 (claiming, without citation, that “[s]hortly after 
Wowinapa identified his father’s body, Chauncey collected a bounty of seventy-five 
dollars from the state for the Sioux chief’s scalp”); Trenerry, The Shooting of Little 
Crow, supra note 174, at 151, 153 (claiming that Chauncey Lamson collected the 
$75 bounty from the State); see also BERG, supra note 9, at 299 (claiming that the 
Lamsons were paid a $25 bounty). 
 189.  How That Indian Was Killed, supra note 176.  
 190.  See Untitled, ST. PAUL DAILY PRESS, Aug. 26, 1863 (calling for the 
legislature to compensate the Lamsons for killing Taoyateduta, noting that “[t]he 
State bounty for killing hostile Sioux is a very inadequate reward for so important 
a service as the killing of Little Crow, and even that, we learn, Mr. Lampson [sic] 
has not applied for”).  
 191.  See, e.g., CONDENSED HISTORY OF MEEKER COUNTY 1855–1939 28 (Frank B. 
Lamson ed. 1939) (claiming that “[t]he scalp of Little Crow was delivered by 
Nathan Lamson to the Adjutant General of the state and he received the state 
bounty of $75”); Little Crow, The Sioux Chief: How the Famous Warrior Met His Death, 
supra note 183 (“Chauncey Lamson, who killed the Sioux chieftain in the brush 
north of Hutchinson, either took or sent the scalp to the adjuntant general of the 
state, to claim the state bounty of $75 which was offered at that time for every dead 
male Indian”). 
 192.  It was not until July 20, 1863, that the Minnesota Adjutant General issued 
General Order 44, which permitted private citizens, not otherwise part of the 
volunteer scouts, to receive a $75 bounty payment.  
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Annual Report for 1863193 or earlier handwritten muster rolls.194 
Despite this, the Minnesota Adjutant General’s records 
acknowledged receipt of “one male Sioux scalp” by Mr. Bates and 
asserted that he was entitled to receipt of $25 because he was part 
of the “military contingent.”195 
The second killing occurred on July 16, 1863.196 The day 
before, two men cutting hay near the town of Waterville in Le 
Sueur County spotted three Indians riding westward.197 Horses had 
been stolen in Rice County, and it was immediately assumed that 
these Indians were the responsible parties.198 Two squads of 
independent scouts were formed to pursue the Dakota.199 One 
squad cut off their retreat southward (toward the Winnebago 
reservation) while the other took to the trail to follow them. The 
latter squad was led by John C. Davis, an experienced hunter and 
former Indian trader.200 
The three Dakota were pursued until 11:00 a.m. on July 16 
when they were overtaken in a thicket on the border of Scotch 
Lake, in the vicinity of Cleveland in Le Sueur County.201 Davis’s 
squad fired on the Dakota, who then returned fire as they were 
fleeing the area. A search discovered a badly wounded Indian lying 
behind a tree.202 The scouts shot him an additional six times, killing 
him.203 One author states that “[t]he wounded Indian was 
 
 193.  ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, supra note 11, at 228–29. 
 194.  Indian Expedition to the Southern Frontier, Minnesota Adjutant General 
Files (on file with the Minnesota Historical Society) (early draft of muster rolls for 
bounty scouts); Muster-In Roll of Captain Sturges, Adjutant-Gen., Military Service 
Records (on file with the Minnesota Historical Society).  
 195.  See Minnesota Office of the State Auditor, Warrants and Supporting 
Papers (July 6, 1863) (on file with the Minnesota Historical Society, restricted 
archives collection). 
 196.  ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, supra note 11, at 348–49. 
 197.  Id.; 2 FOLWELL, supra note 7, at 288; see also Indians in Dakota County, 
FAIRBAULT CENT. REPUBLICAN, July 22, 1863 (containing a seemingly more fanciful 
version of events where three men cutting hay were surprised by two Dakota men 
who sprang from the grass and pushed them into the river before fleeing 
themselves). 
 198.  See 2 FOLWELL, supra note 7, at 288. 
 199.  ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, supra note 11, at 348–49. 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  2 FOLWELL, supra note 7, at 288; Indian Chase in LeSeuer County, WINONA 
DAILY REPUBLICAN, July 22, 1863 (reprinted from the MANKATO RECORD, July 18, 
1863). 
 203.  2 FOLWELL, supra note 7, at 288. The only information provided about 
the Dakota man who died in the attack was that he was between twenty-five and 
thirty years old and not very tall. Late Indian News. Indians at Bloomington. They 
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dispatched in cold blood being worth much more dead than alive 
to the pursuers.”204 One other Dakota was severely wounded,205 and 
it was believed at the time that he went into Scotch Lake to die.206 
Another Dakota succeeded in escaping, although he lost his horse, 
gun, and blanket.207 The attacking party of scouts escaped without 
any casualties,208 and three horses that had supposedly been stolen 
were recovered.209 John C. Davis was paid $25 for the killing on 
October 9, 1863.210 
The next bounty payment was made to William Allen on 
August 7, 1863, apparently211 for killing a Dakota man on July 21, 
 
Endeavor to Drown a Man in the River. An Exciting Hunt in Le Seuer County. One Indian 
Killed and Another Mortally Wounded, ST. CLOUD DEMOCRAT, July 23, 1863 
[hereinafter One Indian Killed]. 
 204.  RODDIS, supra note 134, at 231. 
 205.  ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, supra note 11, at 348–49. 
 206.  See Indian Chase in LeSeuer County, supra note 202; One Indian Killed, supra 
note 203; see also 2 FOLWELL, supra note 7, at 288; Another Indian Sent Home, 
FAIRBAULT CENT. REPUBLICAN, July 22, 1863. 
 207.  ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, supra note 11, at 348–49. 
 208.  Id. 
 209.  2 FOLWELL, supra note 7, at 288; RODDIS, supra note 134, at 231. 
 210.  ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, supra note 11, at 226 (listing 
payment); Minn. Office of the State Auditor, Warrants and Supporting Papers 
(1863) (on file with the Minnesota Historical Society, restricted archives 
collection). At least one newspaper account claimed that Davis had shot the 
wounded Dakota man, and that the dead Indian had been killed by T.M. Perry, Jr. 
Indians, ST. PETER TRIB., July 22, 1863. Another claimed that the scalp was given to 
the owner of a horse that was killed when the Dakota were being pursued, and he 
claimed the state bounty. Indian Chase in LeSeuer County, supra note 202.  
 211.  This conclusion is not without doubt. The facts that follow in the text 
above were drawn from one newspaper article. That article was reprinted in other 
papers, but those papers do not appear to have conducted any independent 
investigation and therefore do nothing to bolster the original article’s credibility. 
See, e.g., Indian News, MANKATO UNION, July 24, 1863 (reprint); Another Indian Killed, 
ST. PAUL PIONEER & DEMOCRAT (WEEKLY), Aug. 14, 1863 (stating only that “[a] 
rumor has reached Cleveland, Le Sueur county, that another Indian had been 
killed near Faribault two or three days ago. He was supposed to be the one who 
escaped from the Le Sueur settlers during the late pursuit”). 
There was one other “Allen” reported in the newspapers as having been 
involved in the killing of a Dakota during this time period. Two Indians were 
reported to have been killed by Captain D.W. Allen’s company in late July. The 
Indians were found “taking a quiet nap” when they were fired upon by Captain 
Allen’s men. Both of them were killed, despite one claiming that he was a “good 
Indian” just prior to his death. Handsomely Done, ST. PAUL PIONEER & DEMOCRAT 
(WEEKLY), Aug. 7, 1863; see also J.F.B., Letter to the Editors, MINNEAPOLIS STATE 
ATLAS, Aug. 12, 1863 (containing a different version of events but still concluding 
that Captain Allen’s company killed two Dakota men). Captain Allen was later 
seen with two scalps dangling from his tent. I considered these events not to be 
the ones underlying the bounty payment made on August 7, 1863, because 
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1863.212 A gentleman referred to in newspaper accounts only as Mr. 
Bliss was out looking for his cattle early in the morning near the 
city of Cleveland, Minnesota, when he discovered an Indian lying 
down near a log a few feet away from him. Bliss was not armed, so 
he returned to Cleveland and gave the alarm.213 Several citizens 
converged on the area and the Dakota man was found in the same 
location, still lying prostrate. A settler shot the Dakota man in the 
knee. This brought him up into a sitting position. The Indian fired 
a shot but was killed by several shots fired by the Rev. Mr. Allen of 
Cleveland. Several other settlers also shot the man, so that when his 
body was eventually examined, it was “completely riddled with 
bullets.”214 Directly under the shoulder blade was an old bullet 
wound, and this led those present to conclude that this was one of 
the Indians who had previously been injured in the fight at Scotch 
Lake.215 
The Dakota man was scalped. The only newspaper account of 
this event noted that “the people were no more excited over the 
event than if a rattle-snake had been killed.”216 Allen was paid $75 
for providing the scalp to the Minnesota Adjutant General’s office, 
presumably because he was an “independent scout” rather than a 
member of the volunteer corps.217 By this time, General Orders No. 
44 was in effect, which authorized bounty payments only for 
“hostile Sioux warrior[s].” No documentation appears in the 
 
(1) Captain Allen’s first name does not match the first name of the person who 
collected the bounty, and (2) a $75 bounty payment would only have been made 
to an “independent scout” pursuant to General Orders No. 44, not an individual 
already serving in the military. Since first names were often incorrectly reported, 
and as the other bounty payments were not made in accordance with the actual 
terms of General Orders Nos. 41, 44, and 60, this assumption may be incorrect. 
 212.  Latest from Le Sueur, ST. PETER TRIB., July 22, 1863. 
 213.  Id. 
 214.  Id. 
 215.  Id.; see also ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, supra note 11, 
at 348–49 (noting that the Dakota man who had been shot at Scotch Lake was 
discovered and killed a few days later).  
 216.  Latest from Le Sueur, supra note 212. 
 217.  ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, supra note 11, at 224; 
Minnesota Office of the State Auditor, Warrants and Supporting Papers (July 6, 
1863) (on file with the Minnesota Historical Society, restricted archives 
collection). Allen was paid via two warrants, one for $25 and the other for $50. 
Both warrants were issued on the same day. State Auditor, Warrants and 
Supporting Papers, Minnesota Archives Collections, Minnesota Historical Society 
(two warrants and one receipt.). One could surmise that the initial paperwork was 
completed for a $25 payment until it was realized that Allen was not part of the 
volunteer corps and was entitled to $75 via General Orders No. 44. Id. 
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remaining government files that could explain how a wounded 
man lying on the ground was determined to be hostile. 
The fourth and final killing that resulted in a bounty payment 
occurred on November 26, 1863. Simon and Oscar Horner were 
hunting and trapping in the Kandiyohi Lake region, about sixty 
miles west of Glencoe, when they saw a party of three Indians, but 
they did not pursue them.218 The next day, they went out in search 
of the party and saw an Indian near Long Lake, about six miles 
northwest of the Big Kandiyohi Lake.219 The Indian saw them and 
tried to flee, but he was shot by Oscar Horner and died. Horner 
scalped the dead Indian.220 He presented the scalp at the Minnesota 
Adjutant General’s office in February 1864 for payment,221 but 
because there was insufficient money in the military contingent 
fund, he was not immediately paid.222 He eventually received the 
$200 bounty payment under General Orders No. 60 on February 
15, 1865.223 
Press reports indicate that the Indian killed was unlikely to 
have been “hostile.” The St. Paul Pioneer noted: 
It is believed by the scouts that the Indians seen by the 
Horners were making their way to the Fort, with the 
intention of surrendering themselves to the authorities. 
Starvation, surrender, or fighting, are believed to be the 
alternatives of the Sioux since the destruction of their 
winter supplies on the Missouri. The Kandiyohi region has 
always been a favorite hunting ground with them, and it is 
not improbable that we may hear during the winter of 
similar adventures in that vicinity to the one above 
referred to.224 
In fact, there were several reports that the Indian killed was actually 
one of General Sibley’s scouts. Sibley had given the scouts who 
served his expedition permission to hunt from the Yellow Medicine 
to certain mounds on the Coteau Prairie. A small party of Dakota 
 
 218.  Sioux in the Kandiyohi Region, ST. PAUL PIONEER (DAILY), Dec. 6, 1863. 
 219.  Id.  
 220.  Id.  
 221.  Scalp Bounty Paid, DAILY MILWAUKEE NEWS, Feb. 11, 1864, at 2. 
 222.  ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, reprinted in EXECUTIVE 
DOCUMENTS OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA FOR THE YEAR 1865, at 8, 285 (1866) 
[hereinafter 1865 MINN. EXEC. DOCS.]. 
 223.  Id. 
 224.  Sioux in the Kandiyohi Region, ST. PAUL PIONEER (DAILY), Dec. 6, 1863. 
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scouts was out hunting and strayed beyond this area. The man shot 
by Horner may have been one of these Indians.225 
The four incidents described above are the only times that the 
state paid out a bounty under General Orders No. 41, 44, or 60 
even though these orders remained on the books for several years. 
Perhaps this explains why white Minnesotans quickly forgot this 
ugly past. By 1912, newspapers were incredulous when proof of the 
Minnesota Adjutant General’s bounty orders resurfaced.226 The 
Dakota never forgot these orders, however, and continue to 
mention them to this day. 
C. The Minnesota Legislature’s Involvement: A Bounty for Killing 
Taoyateduta 
While many scholars have placed blame on the Minnesota 
Legislature, in truth, that body appears to bear no responsibility for 
the creation of the bounty system. In 1863, the Minnesota 
Legislature ended its session on March 6, long before the bounty 
system was put into place.227 In December 1863, Minnesota 
Adjutant General Oscar Malmros finally informed that body of the 
bounty orders he had issued, noting that since the Dakota “seemed 
to have taken possession of the timber, throughout an extensive 
region of the country,” and “[p]erceiving that something in the 
matter should speedily be done . . . it was in your absence, and with 
a hope that the act would meet with your subsequent approval, that 
I issued on the 4th day of July, General Orders, No. 41.”228 It would 
have been common practice at the time to submit a bill during the 
 
 225.  One of Sibley’s Scouts Killed, ST. PAUL PIONEER & DEMOCRAT (WEEKLY), Dec. 
11, 1863. But see The Kandiyohi Indian Again, ST. PAUL PIONEER (DAILY), Dec. 6, 1863 
(claiming that the Indian killed was not one of Sibley’s scouts). 
 226.  Nearly Wins Bet State Pays for Indian Scalps: Attorney General Finds Reward of 
$25 Was Offered by Governor Not Many Years Ago, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Feb. 3, 
1912, microformed on Minnesota Historical Society Scrapbook, vol. 41, roll 14, frame 
145; State’s Head Price $25, Offered in Sioux Days, Scalp Hunters at $1.50 Per Day, 
They to Clothe, Arm and Feed Themselves, ST. PAUL DISPATCH, May 17, 1912, microformed 
on Minnesota Historical Society Scrapbook, vol. 66, roll 22, frame 65.  
 227.  See JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FIFTH SESSION OF 
THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA (1863) (noting that the legislative 
session ran from January 6 through March 6, 1863). In January 1863, a bill was 
introduced by Minnesota Representative John Brisbin entitled “An Act to Outlaw 
Indians.” A copy of the bill no longer exists, and therefore, it is impossible to tell 
whether it was a removal bill, a precursor to the bounty system, or contained 
another proposal. While the bill was twice referred to House committees, it never 
passed that body and it was never introduced in the Senate. Id. at 31, 42, 47. 
 228.  ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, supra note 11, at 346. 
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next legislative session seeking ratification of these actions. Yet no 
such bill was introduced in the Minnesota Legislature during the 
1864 legislative session.229 
While the Minnesota Legislature played no role in the creation 
of the bounty system, it did issue one reward of its own accord. 
As discussed in Part II.B above, the Lamsons had not received any 
monetary reward for killing Taoyateduta. Governor Swift believed 
this to be unjust, and in his annual message to the Minnesota 
Legislature in 1864, he called upon that body to rectify this 
situation.230 On January 13, 1864, Governor Stephen Miller, in his 
inaugural address to the Minnesota Legislature, also made clear his 
belief that Nathan and Chauncey Lamson should be rewarded for 
their “meritorious service,” suggesting that “such provision be 
made for them, as may comport with the dignity of the State.”231 
A bill was drafted almost immediately by Representative Henry 
Hill,232 and it was read in the Minnesota House of Representatives 
for the first time on January 21, 1864.233 As originally introduced, 
the bill would have authorized a $1500 payment to the Lamsons for 
killing Taoyateduta, of which $1000 was to go to Nathan Lamson 
and $500 to Chauncey Lamson.234 The House, however, reduced 
the proposed payments to $500 and $300 respectively,235 and with 
this alteration, the bill passed that chamber by a vote of twenty-four 
for and fourteen against.236 
When the Senate took up the bill, it proved to be slightly more 
contentious. After two attempts,237 a bill passed that body on 
 
 229.  JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SIXTH SESSION OF THE 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA 369–85 (1864) (index listing all House 
and Senate bills) [hereinafter 1864 JOURNAL OF THE MINN. HOUSE]. 
 230.  Annual Message of Governor Swift (Jan. 11, 1864), in 1863 MINN. EXEC. 
DOCS., supra note 11, at 3, 21. 
 231.  Inaugural Address of Governor Miller (Jan. 13, 1864), in 1863 MINN. 
EXEC. DOCS., supra note 11, at 10. 
 232.  Hill was elected from House District 6, which included Meeker County, 
where Taoyateduta was killed by the Lamsons. Trenerry, The Shooting of Little Crow, 
supra note 174, at 150; see Hill, Henry, MINN. LEGIS. REFERENCE LIBR., 
http://www.leg.state.mn.us/legdb/fulldetail.aspx?id=13338 (last visited Dec. 21, 
2013).  
 233.  See 1864 JOURNAL OF THE MINN. HOUSE, supra note 229, at 49; see also id., at 
55, 59, 62 (tracking history of the bill from the Committee on Federal Relations to 
the Committee of the Whole).  
 234.  H.F. 25, 6th Leg. (Minn. 1864). 
 235.  Id. (markups directly on bill). 
 236.  1864 JOURNAL OF THE MINN. HOUSE, supra note 229, at 74–75.  
 237.  At first, there were six for and eleven against, but due to an unknown 
reason, a later vote that same day produced thirteen for and six against. JOURNAL 
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February 18, which compensated Nathan Lamson with $500 and 
eliminated any payment for Chauncey238 even though it was 
Chauncey who had fired the fatal shot. Two days later, the House 
voted to concur in the Senate amendments,239 and on February 24, 
1864, the bill was signed into law by Governor Stephen Miller. 
Stylized as “Act for the relief of Nathan Lamson,” it indicated that 
the payment was being made for killing Taoyateduta and “thereby 
rendering great service to the State.”240 
D. Blue Earth County’s Bounty Order 
The Minnesota bounty system was not only comprised of state-
wide government initiatives. At least one local government—Blue 
Earth County—implemented its own bounty system in the years 
that followed. The triggering event occurred on May 2, 1865, when 
a small group of Dakota attacked the family of Andrew Jewett near 
Garden City in Blue Earth County on the former Winnebago 
Reservation.241 Five people were killed in the attack: Andrew Jewett, 
his wife, both of his parents, and a hired hand. The family’s two-
year-old son was injured but survived.242 
This attack was in no way related to the war between the 
Dakota and the United States. Instead, it appears to have been a 
garden-variety murder perpetrated for money.243 The mastermind 
behind the murders was a mixed-blood man named John 
 
OF THE SENATE OF THE SIXTH SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF 
MINNESOTA 169, 172 (1864).  
 238.  Id.; H.F. No. 25. 
 239.  1864 JOURNAL OF THE MINN. HOUSE, supra note 229, at 202.  
 240.  Act of Feb. 24, 1864, ch. 84, 1864 Minn. Laws 352. 
 241.  Annual Message of Governor Miller, in 1865 MINN. EXEC. DOCS., supra 
note 222, at 3, 24; Startling News!! More Indian Murders!! A Whole Family Murdered on 
the Winnebago Reservation, ST. PAUL PIONEER (DAILY), May 2, 1865 [hereinafter 
Startling News]. Prior to 1864, Garden City was known as the town of Watonwan. 
HUGHES, supra note 93, at 143.  
 242.  Annual Message of Governor Miller, supra note 241, at 24; Startling News, 
supra note 241; see also The Indian Murders in Blue Earth County. The Particulars, 
ST. PAUL PIONEER (DAILY), May 5, 1865 (providing details of the murders). The 
scene was disturbing. Family members were “shot and hacked to death, their 
bodies scattered in and around the family cabin.” Chuck Lewis, Frontier Fears: The 
Clash of Dakotas and Whites in the Newspapers of Mankato, Minnesota, 1863–1865, 
5 MINN. HERITAGE 36, 49 (2012). 
 243.  See, e.g., Startling News, supra note 241 (noting that the “Jewetts pockets, 
and a box or chest in the house were rifled, [indicating that] the murderers 
[were] probably searching for money”). 
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Campbell.244 Campbell had served in a Civil War cavalry battalion 
since September 1861 and was deployed in the southern United 
States when the U.S.-Dakota War began the following year.245 In the 
spring of 1863, Campbell overheard one of his fellow soldiers 
mention that he had sent $500 to Andrew Jewett to purchase a 
Minnesota homestead for him.246 Campbell deserted his post 
shortly thereafter, intending to get the money.247 
After murdering the Jewett family, Campbell split from the rest 
of his group and began walking towards Mankato.248 While en 
route, he was stopped by a local citizen and taken to the county jail 
for questioning.249 That night, a few Mankato citizens were allowed 
into the jail, where they attempted to torture a confession out of 
Campbell without success.250 They did, however, find in his 
possession items that were later confirmed to be the property of the 
Jewett family.251 Later on, a roll of money was found in Campbell’s 
jail cell that was believed to be taken from the Jewett family.252 
By the morning of May 3, 1865, hundreds of people had 
gathered outside the jail, threatening to lynch Campbell.253 As a 
compromise, it was suggested that he be immediately tried.254 
A judge, prosecutor, and jurors were quickly named from persons 
 
 244.  Lewis, supra note 242, at 49, 51. 
 245.  Descriptive Roll and Account Pay and Clothing of Deserters from 
Company G 5th Iowa Cavalry, Minnesota Adjutant General Files (on file with the 
Minnesota Historical Society) [hereinafter Descriptive Roll and Account Pay]; 
Annual Message of Governor Miller, supra note 241, at 24; Startling News, supra 
note 241. 
 246.  HUGHES, supra note 93, at 149. 
 247.  See Startling News, supra note 241; Descriptive Roll and Account Pay, 
supra note 245. A few sources claim that Campbell was also motivated by his desire 
to avenge the death of his brother, Baptiste Campbell, who was one of the thirty-
eight Dakota hung at Mankato in December 1862. DANIEL BUCK, INDIAN 
OUTBREAKS 246 (1904); HUGHES, supra note 93, at 149. 
 248.  BUCK, supra note 247, at 247; HUGHES, supra note 93, at 150. 
 249.  HUGHES, supra note 93, at 151. 
 250.  Id. 
 251.  Id.; WALTER N. TRENERRY, MURDER IN MINNESOTA: A COLLECTION OF TRUE 
CASES 43 (1985) [hereinafter TRENERRY, MURDER IN MINNESOTA]. 
 252.  Blood for Blood!! Executive Clemency to Indians Rebuked. John Campbell, the 
Half-Breed Murderer Hung at Mankato. He Makes a Full Confession of His Guilt. One 
Hundred Hostile Savages Near Mankato. Nine Hundred More on the War Path. An Indian 
Sympathizer Compelled to Flee the Wrath of the People. The Citizens of Mankato and St. Peter 
Guarding Their Homes, ST. PAUL PIONEER (DAILY), May 5, 1865 [hereinafter Blood for 
Blood]. 
 253.  HUGHES, supra note 93, at 152; The Trial and Execution of John L. Campbell, 
ST. PETER TRIB., May 10, 1865. 
 254.  HUGHES, supra note 93, at 152. 
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in the crowd.255 Four hours of testimony was received about 
Campbell’s “character as a desperado and outlaw,” “his complicity 
[in] other frontier murders,” the conflicting statements he offered 
to officials following the Jewett murders, and the family’s objects 
found in his possession.256 No one represented Campbell, and while 
he testified on his own behalf, he was unable to call any witnesses in 
his defense due to his incarceration and immediate trial.257 Within a 
half-hour of the end of this “trial,” the jury returned a unanimous 
guilty verdict but suggested that the prisoner be held over until the 
regular term of the district court for a fuller trial.258 
Instead of heeding the jury’s suggestion, the mob rushed 
Campbell and took him out to a tree to be hanged. After several 
botched attempts, they were successful in strangling him.259 Press 
coverage noted that it was “an exciting day in Mankato”260 and 
claimed that these “exasperated people” could not be blamed for 
the lynching, since there was legitimate concern that the 
perpetrator would escape punishment given the government’s 
refusal to execute most of the Dakota condemned to death in 
1862.261 
The five other Dakota who participated in the attack 
encountered General Sibley’s scouts as they fled west, and all but 
one were killed.262 Nevertheless, to ensure that settlers would be 
protected from any potential future attacks, the Minnesota 
Adjutant General created a unit of “Mounted Minute Men” 
 
 255.  Id.; TRENERRY, MURDER IN MINNESOTA supra note 251, at 43–44; Blood for 
Blood, supra note 252. 
 256.  The Trial and Execution of John L. Campbell, supra note 253. 
 257.  TRENERRY, MURDER IN MINNESOTA, supra note 251, at 43; see also The Trial 
and Execution of John L. Campbell, supra note 253. 
 258.  HUGHES, supra note 93, at 153; The Trial and Execution of John L. Campbell, 
supra note 253. 
 259.  HUGHES, supra note 93, at 153–54; TRENERRY, MURDER IN MINNESOTA, 
supra note 251, at 44. 
 260.  Blood for Blood, supra note 252. 
 261.  The Indian News, ST. PAUL PIONEER & DEMOCRAT (WEEKLY), May 12, 1865. 
In his annual message to the Minnesota legislature the following January, 
Governor Miller acknowledged but showed no concern for this lawless behavior. 
Annual Message of Governor Miller, supra note 241, at 24 (stating that Campbell’s 
“guilty participation having been fully demonstrated, he was summarily hung at 
Mankato without reference to the ordinary forms of law”).  
 262.  Annual Message of Governor Miller, supra note 241, at 24–25; Important 
Indian News. The Murderers of the Jewett Family Intercepted and Killed. No Other Party 
Known to Be on the Frontier, Letter from Fort Wadsworth, ST. PAUL PIONEER (DAILY), 
May 26, 1865. 
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stationed in and around Mankato.263 Along with the companies 
already in existence, there were now more than 400 soldiers 
stationed in southwestern Minnesota to guard against future 
Dakota attacks.264 
The local response to the Jewett murders was also swift. On 
May 17, 1865, the Blue Earth County Board of Commissioners met 
and adopted a resolution offering a bounty of $200 for “each and 
every Sioux Indian hereafter killed within the limits of the county 
until[] this resolution shall be rescinded.”265 The money was to be 
paid upon production of the scalp and proof that the person 
claiming the payment had both killed the Indian in question and 
that he had done so within county limits.266 No bounty payments 
appear to have been made pursuant to this resolution even though 
it was not officially repealed until March 19, 1872.267 
Additionally, E. P. Evans, a friend of the murdered Andrew 
Jewett, organized an expedition to the southern United States to 
purchase “‘blood hounds with which to hunt Indians.”268 The funds 
for this trip were provided by three Minnesota counties (Blue 
Earth, Martin, and Watonwan) and a select number of private 
citizens, including a $100 personal donation from Governor 
Miller.269 Evans ultimately purchased thirteen dogs that were 
distributed among these counties in August 1865.270 The hounds 
were never used for their intended purpose, and they “escaped one 
after another and soon like the Indians disappeared from Blue 
Earth County.”271 
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E. The End of Minnesota Bounties? State v. Gut 
Another garden-variety murder also played a significant role in 
the Minnesota bounty system a few years after the Jewett family 
murders. New Ulm, a predominately German settlement in Brown 
County, Minnesota, was in the midst of Christmas Day celebrations 
on December 25, 1866.272 On that day, two trappers from the 
nearby town of Mankato—Alexander Campbell and George 
Liscom273—travelled to New Ulm to sell some of their furs to a local 
trader.274 Campbell and Liscom were both white Americans in their 
twenties275 who had served three years in the military.276 On this day, 
however, they had just returned from trapping in the woods, and 
their dress included a mixture of white and Dakota elements. 
Campbell was wearing moccasins, a dark blue hood or blanket 
around his head, buckskins, and a knife at his belt.277 Liscom was 
also wearing a knife attached to his belt.278 Both men were tanned 
from having spent considerable time outdoors.279 
After selling their furs, Campbell and Liscom entered the 
National Hall, a local saloon. At the saloon, they spoke in Dakota, 
French, and English (or at least in jargons that the mostly German-
speaking New Ulm residents believed to be those languages).280 
They played a game of cards281 and met a New Ulm man named 
John Spinner.282 Spinner coaxed the men into pretending to be 
Indians. While Spinner tapped on a kettle, Campbell and Liscom 
danced about the room, brandishing their knives and mimicking 
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the motion of scalping their enemies.283 Everyone in the saloon 
watched the performance. 
At some point, a dispute arose over the liquor bill. Liscom was 
told that he owed seventy-five cents even though he believed he 
owed only fifteen cents.284 He refused to pay the difference, but a 
man who had ridden into town with Liscom and Campbell seemed 
to defuse the situation by paying the bill.285 It is not clear from the 
trial record whether it was the dispute over the liquor bill, the fact 
that Campbell and Liscom referred to themselves as Yankees, or 
some other matter that sparked the fatal fight. Regardless, Spinner 
turned on Liscom; he forced Liscom outside and struck him in the 
head with an ax or a club, most likely fracturing Liscom’s skull.286 
Campbell came to his friend’s defense, slashing at Spinner with a 
knife. While he may have only intended to intimidate Spinner into 
backing off, Campbell severed an artery in Spinner’s leg and sent 
blood everywhere.287 
At this point, the Brown County Sheriff arrived and took 
Campbell and Liscom into custody. Even though Liscom had life 
threatening injuries, the sheriff did not provide him with medical 
assistance. Instead, he forced the men to strip, handcuffed them, 
and placed them in jail cells.288 When Spinner died from blood loss 
later that evening, news of his death spread rapidly through the 
town. Just after the arrest was made, a report began circulating 
around town that “two half-breeds” had murdered John Spinner.289 
Only thirty minutes after the arrests, a crowd of over one 
hundred men assembled at the jail. The crowd repeatedly chanted: 
“Bring out the half-breeds! Hang the half-breeds! Out with the 
Indians!”290 George Schneider, who later became a witness for the 
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State, testified that the crowd began calling out that Alexander 
Campbell was the brother of John Campbell, the mixed-blood 
Dakota who had been executed for killing the Jewett family just one 
year earlier.291 In actuality, neither Alexander Campbell nor George 
Liscom had any Dakota ancestry, and Alexander Campbell was not 
related to John Campbell.292 The crowd eventually stormed the jail 
and dragged out Campbell and Liscom, who were still in 
handcuffs.293 Liscom was killed first. He was struck in the head and 
then hanged from a ladder leaning against the jail.294 Campbell was 
next. 
John Gut, a soldier with Company H of Minnesota’s Tenth 
Regiment, arrived around the same time that the crowd broke 
open the jail.295 Gut pushed to the front of the mob and stabbed 
Campbell.296 When he was criticized by a witness for stabbing the 
prisoner, he replied: “These two half-breeds killed my best friend, 
John Spinner, and I will kill them; let me alone or I will stab you!”297 
The crowd parted, and Gut continued to stab, kick, and beat 
Campbell (as did others in the crowd) until Campbell was hanged 
from the jail window gratings.298 
After the lynching, Gut returned to the Pennsylvania House, 
the hotel he was staying at.299 Even though he was covered in blood 
and wearing a military uniform, which made him easy to identify, 
Gut seemed unconcerned. In fact, he struck up a conversation with 
a stranger and confessed that he had just killed two Indians in 
retaliation for their having killed a German.300 Gut’s confidence was 
understandable because lynching was not unheard of during this 
time period. Between 1857 and 1865, at least six persons (four of 
whom were Indians) were lynched in Minnesota, and none of the 
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persons who participated in their murders were ultimately brought 
to justice.301 
Governor William Marshall was concerned that New Ulm 
would not punish the citizens responsible for lynching Campbell 
and Liscom.302 These concerns led Marshall to dispatch Minnesota 
Attorney General William Colvill to New Ulm on January 5, 1867. 
Colvill was to determine whether a fair trial was possible in New 
Ulm.303 At first, he believed it would be,304 but he quickly changed 
his mind.305 In a formal report to the governor, Colvill noted that 
New Ulm had not attempted to identify the offenders or bring 
them to justice before his arrival.306 Furthermore, while almost half 
of the town’s citizens had been in “full view of the whole scene, 
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they could not remember a single person engaged in it.”307 Colvill 
also believed that the Sheriff of Brown County may have acted in 
concert with the mob, and at a minimum, the Sheriff consented to 
the removal of Campbell and Liscom’s bodies.308 For these reasons, 
the attorney general informed the governor that he was convinced 
a fair trial could not be had in New Ulm. 
In his report, Colvill also provided some details about the 
lynching, gathered through dozens of interviews. He believed that 
the mob became infuriated by the false rumor that the two men 
were “half-breeds” who had stabbed Spinner without provocation.309 
Anticipating an argument that would later become part of Gut’s 
defense, Colvill wrote: 
If half-breeds have no rights, and it is lawful to hang them 
without judge or jury, the fact that these men were 
mistaken for them by a portion of the mob might go in 
mitigation of the offense, so far as that portion is 
concerned; but until that principle is established by our 
courts, this offense having been clearly premeditated as 
above stated, is murder in the first degree.310 
Colvill’s report was forwarded to the legislature with the request 
that legislation be enacted that would ensure a change of venue. 
The legislature took action in March 1867, and under a newly 
enacted law, the case against John Gut and his fellow lynchers was 
moved to Redwood Falls and began with the calling of a grand jury. 
The first grand jury failed to return an indictment, however, and 
District Court Judge Horace Austin lectured the jurors for more 
than thirty minutes, stating that he would continue to convene new 
grand juries “until the accused are tried, and if guilty, properly 
punished.”311 The second grand jury convened in September 1867 
and indicted John Gut and twelve others on first degree murder 
charges.312 Each case was to be tried separately. Gut then filed his 
own change of venue motion, which was approved, and this time 
the case was transferred to neighboring Nicollet County.313 Gut 
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“interposed the plea of insanity, with the plea of not guilty.”314 After 
several continuances, the trial began on January 23, 1868.315 
The trial included several well-known Minnesotans. Horace 
Austin remained the district court judge. He had helped defend 
New Ulm against the Dakota in 1862 and had later served as 
captain of a mounted ranger company before being elected district 
court judge in the fall of 1864.316 The State was represented by its 
Attorney General, Francis Cornell. John Gut was represented by 
various attorneys, including Charles Flandrau. Flandrau was a 
former Nicollet County prosecutor and an associate justice on the 
Minnesota Supreme Court.317 He was also knowledgeable in Indian 
affairs, having served as the U.S. Indian agent for the Dakota 
reservations in 1856–57.318 His view of the Dakota, however, was 
substantially altered by the U.S.-Dakota War, during which he 
successfully led the defense of New Ulm against a vigorous Dakota 
attack.319 Afterwards he wrote General Sibley a letter advocating for 
the killing of all Dakota, including women and children.320 These 
personal views no doubt colored Flandrau’s defense of Gut. 
Attorney General Cornell had no problem proving that John 
Gut killed Campbell. Several witnesses testified that he had stabbed 
Campbell repeatedly, both before and after he was hanged. Charles 
Flandrau represented John Gut at trial and set forth various 
defenses. He argued that Gut was drunk and insane and should not 
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be held legally responsible for his acts.321 Flandrau also argued that 
the 1867 Act, which allowed the location of the trial to be moved 
from Brown County, was unconstitutional. Finally, he claimed that 
the Minnesota Adjutant General’s 1863 bounty orders should 
provide a defense for Gut in these proceedings. 
In fact, Flandrau opened the defense’s case with an offer of 
proof. He told the court that he wished to call two witnesses who 
would establish the following: 
1st. That at the time of the killing of Alexander 
Campbell . . . there existed a state of war between the 
United States and the Sioux tribe of Indians, which tribe 
or Nation is composed of Indians and Half-breeds. The 
actual theatre of which war was the State of Minnesota, 
and particularly the western frontier of said State. . . . 
2nd. That the State of Minnesota through its legal 
authorities offered rewards for the killing by any person of 
any male of said tribe, which offer was then in full force. 
That the said Campbell and one Liscome, came into the 
Town of New Ulm on the day said Campbell was killed 
from the western frontier of this State. That said 
Campbell and Liscome . . . were then and there draped in 
the garb of Half breeds of said tribe of Indians, spoke the 
language of said tribe, and danced the war dance and 
other dances of said tribe, and then and there killed John 
Spenner, a citizen of the United States, and resident of 
the Town of New Ulm, Brown County, Minnesota. 
3rd. That the mode of warfare of said tribe of Indians 
and Half breeds was and is by small bands or parties of 
said Indians and Half breeds making incursions into the 
frontier settlements, and killing single persons or families. 
4th. That the parties who killed said Campbell 
including this defendant were then and are now citizens 
of the United States, and then and there believed said 
Campbell to be an Indian or half breed of said tribe of 
Sioux Indians so at war with the United States as 
aforesaid, and then and there engaged in such war in the 
killing of said Spenner, and that the killing of said 
Campbell was from no other motive whatsoever.322 
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In addition to this offer of proof, Flandrau provided authenticated 
copies of Minnesota Adjutant General Orders Nos. 41 and 44. 
Francis Cornell, counsel for the State, objected to this offer and the 
court took the matter under consideration. The next day, however, 
Judge Austin ruled that the testimony would not be admitted. 
Flandrau lodged his objection in the record and continued to press 
the matter by requesting jury instructions on this defense.323 Judge 
Austin, however, did not alter his decision. 
On January 31, 1868, after three hours of deliberation, the jury 
found John Gut guilty of murder in the first degree for the killing 
of Alexander Campbell.324 The jury recommended that the 
defendant be granted mercy rather than be executed for the 
crime.325 Despite this, Judge Austin ordered that Gut be taken to 
the county jail and kept in solitary confinement until Friday, April 
3, 1868, when he was to be hanged.326 
Flandrau appealed Gut’s case to the Minnesota Supreme 
Court, and while the case was pending, Judge Austin granted a stay 
of execution.327 On appeal, Flandrau raised several legal challenges, 
but all were rejected by the court. With respect to Flandrau’s 
argument that the Minnesota Adjutant General’s bounty orders 
provided a justification or excuse for Gut’s actions, the court noted 
that while it is legal to kill an enemy soldier in the heat of war, “to 
kill such an enemy after he has laid down his arms, and especially 
when he is confined in prison, is murder.”328 Therefore, the court 
concluded that any evidence regarding whether a state of war 
continued to exist between the Dakota and the United States was 
immaterial.329 
Despite this, the court went on to question the legality of the 
bounty orders themselves. It noted that the bounty orders were not 
laws passed by the Minnesota Legislature and that a “proclamation 
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or order of any officer of the state could not make that right which 
is wrong, or legal which is illegal.”330 The court refused to even 
admit that the Minnesota Adjutant General had issued these 
orders, noting only that “if” such orders were made and they led an 
ignorant person to commit a crime, then the only recourse would 
be an appeal to the governor for executive clemency.331 
Upon hearing of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision, on 
February 27, 1869, Charles Flandrau immediately wrote Governor 
Marshall. In his letter, Flandrau stated that the court’s decision left 
it to the Governor to fix the time of Gut’s execution, but that he 
wished to seek executive clemency in the case and he believed the 
Attorney General would “cheerfully join” him in that request.332 
Flandrau claimed that Gut was insane at the time the offense was 
committed, but he was unable to prove this at trial because he was a 
stranger to the town and only there temporarily with his military 
company.333 
Months later, no action had been taken in Gut’s case. 
Although Flandrau had appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
which was reviewing the matter, no stay of execution had been 
issued. District Court Judge Horace Austin wrote to Governor 
Marshall to determine what was to be done with Gut, who had been 
languishing in the county jail—a facility not fit to confine a person 
for long periods of time—since September 1867.334 Judge Austin 
recommended that the sentence be commuted to imprisonment 
for life or a term of years because “i[f] any one is to be executed for 
those New Ulm murders, he is not the most fit man for the 
example.”335 He also requested that Gut be sent to the state 
penitentiary.336 
On February 15, 1870, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the 
decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court. The next day, Charles 
Flandrau once again wrote to the governor seeking to save his 
client’s life. This time, however, he was writing to Horace Austin. 
The former trial judge in the case had been elected governor of 
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Minnesota and took the oath of office in January 1870.337 Flandrau’s 
letter informed Governor Austin of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision and requested that the governor “see the matter in a light 
that will induce you to save his [John Gut’s] life.”338 
Flandrau’s plea claimed that Gut’s actions were somehow 
diminished because he believed the victim was a Dakota: 
The act was done in hotblood, and in any opinion under a 
mistake as to the person who was killed. I have always had 
full faith in the statement which was made on the trial that 
they supposed the murdered parties were half breeds, and 
had they known they were white men they would not have 
killed them. If you can possibly change the sentence to 
imprisonment, compatibly with your sense of duty, I hope 
you will do so.339 
It is not known for certain whether Flandrau’s words had any 
effect, but a few days later, Governor Austin did commute Gut’s 
sentence from execution to life imprisonment.340 And three years 
later, after additional brief correspondence with John Gut 
himself,341 Austin reduced Gut’s sentence from life imprisonment 
to ten years, just as his term as governor was about to expire. 
In commuting Gut’s sentence, Governor Austin noted that the 
other men who had been indicted had fled the country and were, 
therefore, never punished.342 
It took the mistaken murders of two white men to end the 
bounty system. While the Minnesota Adjutant General’s bounty 
orders were never formally repealed, they were never used again 
following the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Gut, 
and they disappeared into the recesses of white Minnesotans’ 
memories. 
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 339.  Id. 
 340.  Letter from Charles Flandrau to Horace Austin, Governor (Mar. 4, 1870) 
(on file with the Minnesota Historical Society). 
 341.  Letter from John Gutt to Horace Austin, Governor (Nov. 9, 1873) (on 
file with the Minnesota Historical Society); Letter from John Gutt to Horace 
Austin, Governor (Dec. 28, 1873) (on file with the Minnesota Historical Society). 
 342.  TRENERRY, MURDER IN MINNESOTA, supra note 251, at 52. 
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III. BOUNTIES AND THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR 
The bounty system described in Section II above was created 
by state officials. Its inspiration, however, may have come from the 
federal government. Just following the end of hostilities in 1862, 
General John Pope, the commander of the U.S. Military’s 
Department of the Northwest, directed Henry Sibley to offer a $500 
reward for Taoyateduta “dead or alive” and a $50 reward “for each 
principal Chief of his band.”343 Pope immediately informed General 
Halleck that he had authorized the bounty, noting that he 
intended to make Little Crow “an outlaw among Indians.”344 
In the summer of 1863, General Sully and General Sibley were 
placed in charge of the expedition to annihilate the remaining 
Dakota who had fled west following the Battle of Wood Lake. At 
that time, General Sully requested permission to expand on Pope’s 
efforts by placing bounties on other Dakota.345 In a June 1, 1863 
letter, U.S. Assistant Adjutant General Selfridge granted him that 
permission.346 There is no indication that any monies were paid out 
in response to these federal bounties. Indeed, when Taoyateduta 
was ultimately killed, it was the Minnesota Legislature, not the 
federal government, who provided Nathan Lamson with a $500 
reward (although it is curious that the sum paid was the same 
amount originally offered by the federal government). 
Nevertheless, bounties were authorized by federal officials. 
There is at least one significant difference between these 
federal bounties and the Minnesota bounties previously discussed. 
The State initially authorized a bounty on all Dakota men. Later, it 
altered this order and restricted the bounty to “hostile” Dakota 
men, but this hostility requirement was never enforced in practice. 
None of the Dakota killed under this bounty system instigated the 
conflict that ultimately led to their death; these men were shot 
simply because they were Dakota. The federal bounties, on the 
 
 343.  Letter from John Pope, Major-Gen., to Henry Sibley, Brigadier-Gen. 
(Oct. 6, 1862) (on file with the Minnesota Historical Society). 
 344.  Letter from Major-Gen. John Pope to Major-Gen. Henry Halleck (Oct. 7, 
1862), in 13 WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, supra note 2, at 716. 
 345.  Unfortunately, a copy of this letter was not included in WAR OF THE 
REBELLION, and this author has been unable to locate it in the collections of the 
Minnesota Historical Society or the National Archives. It is therefore unclear 
which specific Dakota General Sully was requesting federal bounties be placed on. 
 346.  Letter from Major & Assistant Adjutant-Gen. R. O. Selfridge to Brigadier-
Gen. Alfred Sully (June 1, 1863), in 22 WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, PART II, 
supra note 82, at 306. 
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other hand, were tied to specific named persons who were believed 
to have played a key role in the war during the fall of 1862. 
While there is no indication that the federal government knew 
about the Minnesota bounty system, it was aware of similar systems 
in other states. For example, around the same time that the 
Minnesota Adjutant General was placing a bounty on Dakota 
heads, the Arizona Legislature was placing a bounty on Apache 
people,347 and local governments in California were attempting to 
eradicate all Indian people through their own public and private 
bounties.348 The federal government not only knew about these 
 
 347.  In 1864, John Goodwin, the federally appointed Territorial Governor of 
Arizona, successfully pushed the Arizona Legislature to pass a resolution 
endorsing the extermination of Apaches. KATHLEEN P. CHAMBERLAIN, VICTORIO: 
APACHE WARRIOR AND CHIEF 107 (2007). The legislature ultimately offered a 
“reward for every Apache brought in, dead or alive,” and the system was described 
as “the same sort of bounty that was used to be offered for wolf scalps.” Id. 
Prior to 1864, bounties were placed on Apache by local governmental units 
within the Arizona territory or, in the alternative, by private groups who raised 
money to pay their own bounty for Apache scalps. Karl Jacoby, “The Broad Platform 
of Extermination”: Nature and Violence in the Nineteenth Century North American 
Borderlands, 10 J. GENOCIDE RES. 249, 253 (2008). Connecticut-born judge Joseph 
Pratt Allyn, for example, noted upon his arrival in Arizona in 1863 that “a war of 
extermination has in fact already begun” and that Apache “Indians are shot 
wherever seen.” Id. The judge witnessed several organizational meetings for 
civilian campaigns, at which settlers not only volunteered their own services as 
“Indian hunters,” but also contributed towards a bounty for Indian scalps. Id. The 
judge noted that these expeditions “enjoyed a degree of official support” and were 
widespread. Id. An article published in the New York Times in 1885 shows that these 
Apache bounties were used until the late 1800s, with rewards ranging from $250 to 
$500 for Apache scalps in Cochise, Pima, and Yavapai Counties. Money for Indian 
Scalps, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1885 (“From time immemorial all border countries 
have offered rewards for bear and wolf scalps and other animals that destroyed the 
pioneer’s stock or molested his family. Why, therefore, asks the Arizona settler, 
should not the authorities place a reward upon the head of the terrible Apache, 
who murders the white man’s family and steals his stock like the wolves?”). 
 348.  Municipal governments in California offered bounties for Indian heads 
or scalps. JAMES J. RAWLS, INDIANS OF CALIFORNIA: THE CHANGING IMAGE 185 (1984). 
Shasta City, for example, offered $5 for every Indian head presented at city 
headquarters. Id. In 1859, a community near Marysville paid bounties that were 
collected by public subscription “for every scalp or some other satisfactory 
evidence” that an Indian had been killed. Id. Funds were raised in Tehama County 
in 1861 “to be disbursed in payment of Indian scalps.” Id. And two years later, the 
citizens of Honey Lake paid twenty-five cents for each Indian scalp. Id. 
In addition to these local governmental programs, men joined various 
volunteer militia groups to exterminate California Indians, and they were 
permitted to submit claims to the state for their expenses. Id. In 1851 and 1852, 
the California legislature authorized payment of claims totaling over $1 million. 
Id. The federal government later reimbursed the state for these expenses. Id. 
at 186; see also WALTON BEAN & JAMES J. RAWLS, CALIFORNIA: AN INTERPRETIVE 
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programs, but it reimbursed some of the expenses associated with 
them. 
In fact, during this time period, federal officials frequently 
called for the extermination of all Indians. Indeed, extermination 
could be said to be the official policy of the federal government 
until President Grant unveiled his “Peace Policy” in 1870, and state 
bounties were one means of achieving this goal. But were these 
bounties legal? More specifically, was the Minnesota bounty system 
legal when enacted? What about the federal bounty on Dakota 
leaders? 
If the Dakota were citizens of a sovereign state at war with the 
United States, the legality of the orders is measured against the laws 
and customs of war. As discussed in Part III.A below, those laws 
establish that offering a monetary reward for the killing of enemy 
troops is an assassination, and even in 1863, assassinations were 
clearly prohibited both by the European laws of war, and by U.S. 
domestic law. Consequently, offering money for Dakota scalps was 
illegal if the Dakota could be considered a sovereign state at war 
with the United States, regardless of whether the bounty was placed 
on Dakota leaders or Dakota men in general.349 
On the other hand, if the Dakota were not considered a 
sovereign state engaged in war with the United States, those 
persons involved in attacks or assaults on U.S. citizens might 
instead be considered outlaws or guerrillas. In that case, the Dakota 
who killed military and civilian forces would be considered to have 
violated the laws of war and could be lawfully punished. The laws of 
war suggested that punishment be meted out by a military 
commission or court martial, but in the heat of war, it was not 
uncommon for blame to be assigned and punishment carried out 
by summary execution. Still, even in these cases, the individuals 
 
HISTORY 130–31 (1988). 
 349.  The laws of war also prohibited the killing of disabled enemy soldiers, 
and such acts were punishable by death. Disabled enemy soldiers were to be taken 
as prisoners of war and were entitled to certain minimum conditions while being 
held as such. If the Dakota were considered a sovereign state at war with the 
United States in 1863, then the prohibition on killing disabled enemy soldiers 
should have applied to U.S. and Minnesota forces engaged in fighting them. At 
least one of the bounty payments made violated these principles. John C. Davis was 
mustered in as a member of the Minnesota military under General Orders 41, yet 
he accepted payment for the killing of a wounded Dakota solider. See supra notes 
196–210 and accompanying text. He should have been subjected to trial by courts-
martial or military commission, and if found guilty, been executed. This, of 
course, did not happen. 
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subject to punishment bore individual culpability. Thus, if the 
fighting Dakota were not lawful belligerents under the laws of war, 
they might be legally executed for their crimes, but only for their 
individual acts. The federal bounty on Taoyateduta might therefore 
have been legal, but the initial Minnesota bounty, which authorized 
the killing of all Dakota men, was clearly not. Likewise, the 
amended Minnesota bounty orders could provide no defense to 
persons who murdered Dakota men in the summer of 1863 without 
any proof of their “hostility.” 
A. Laws and Customs of War in 1863 
In 1863, the United States was in the middle of the Civil War. 
The international laws and customs of land warfare did not 
technically apply to that conflict, since those laws pertain only to 
wars between sovereign nations or belligerents, not internal strife.350 
At first, the Union adopted this hardline position, claiming that full 
belligerent rights would not be granted to the Confederate armies, 
and persons taking up arms against the United States would be 
liable for treason. But as the hostilities increased in intensity during 
1861, the Lincoln administration began applying more of the laws 
and customs of land warfare to the conflict.351 By 1862, the Union 
had accorded the Confederate States full belligerent rights on 
humanitarian grounds, even though it still did not recognize the 
Confederacy as a separate sovereign.352 The conduct of the Civil 
War is thus a rich resource for the laws and customs of war 
prevailing at the time the Minnesota Adjutant General authorized a 
bounty system on Dakota men. 
Proclamations, orders, and correspondence issued by Union 
officers during the first two years of the Civil War establish the basic 
contours of the laws and customs of land warfare. For example, on 
January 1, 1862, Major General Halleck353 issued General Orders 
 
 350.  Mark Grimsley, “Rebels” and “Redskins”: U.S. Military Conduct Toward White 
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OF WAR 139 (Mark Grimsley & Clifford J. Rogers eds., 2002). 
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CONFLICT 8 (Transaction Publishers 2011) (1983). 
 352.  HARTIGAN, supra note 351, at 9. 
 353.  As a graduate of West Point and an army officer of more than twenty 
years, Halleck was well acquainted with the international laws and customs of war. 
He was also an attorney and an author, having written several books on military 
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No. 1, which established the rules of engagement for troops in the 
Department of the Missouri, where he was the commanding 
officer.354 That order noted that a soldier in the enemy’s service was 
not individually responsible for killing a human being in battle, 
and he could not be punished for doing so. Enemy soldiers were 
only subject to punishment if they violated the laws of war by, for 
example, committing common crimes (e.g., robbery, theft, 
arson),355 killing an enemy who had already been disabled, crossing 
enemy lines in civilian clothing and failing to report to the nearest 
post,356 using poisoned weapons, or committing an assassination.357 
In such cases, they were to be tried and punished by courts-martial 
or military commissions.358 
If captured Confederate soldiers had not violated the laws and 
customs of war, they were to be accorded all of the rights of 
prisoners of war.359 Military correspondence indicated that 
prisoners of war were “entitled to proper accommodations, to 
courteous and respectful treatment, to one ration a day and to 
consideration according to rank.”360 It was impractical to house 
 
subjects. CARNAHAN, supra note 351, at 28. One of those books was a treatise on 
international law published just prior to the start of the Civil War, which included 
a detailed discussion of the laws of war. See generally H.W. HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW OR RULES REGULATING THE INTERCOURSE OF STATES IN PEACE AND WAR (1st ed. 
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DEP’T OF WAR, THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL 
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 355.  Id. at 249; see also Proclamation of J.C. Fremont (Aug. 30, 1861), in 1 WAR 
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destroy railroad tracks, bridges, or telegraph wires “shall suffer the extreme 
penalty of the law” and that all persons not in military uniform but “with arms in 
their hands within [Union] lines shall be tried by court-martial and if found guilty 
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 356.  Letter from Major-Gen. Henry Halleck to Confederate Maj.-Gen. Sterling 
Price (Jan. 27, 1862), in 1 WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. II, supra note 354, at 161 
(discussing the capture of a Confederate soldier in civilian dress with a flag of 
truce in his pocket who had not reported to the first military post upon crossing 
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 357.  HALLECK, supra note 353, at 399–400. 
 358.  General Orders No. 1, supra note 354, at 248–49. 
 359.  Id. 
 360.  Letter from Quartermaster-Gen. M.C. Meigs to Sec’y of War Simon 
Cameron (July 12, 1861), in 3 U.S. DEP’T OF WAR, WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. II 8, 
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large numbers of prisoners of war, so prisoners were often 
exchanged during the Civil War. Prisoners of war were also 
released after offering an oath of allegiance or signing a general 
parole agreeing not to take up arms against the United States 
again.361 
Despite the clarity of these basic principles, there was 
considerable confusion about how to handle particular situations 
that arose in the field.362 Orders issued by military commanders 
were not always available on the front lines, and regardless, they 
were not meant to be comprehensive. Military officers were 
expected to have a base of knowledge about the international laws 
and customs of war through their military training. Unfortunately, 
they did not. When the Civil War started in 1861, there were only 
16,000 men in the entire U.S. army. More than 2 million men 
would serve in the Union army alone by the end of the war.363 
Consequently, nearly all of the troops and officers were civilians 
with no knowledge of the laws of war.364 
This problem was exacerbated by the lack of readily available 
resources on the laws and customs of war. While international law 
theorists had written numerous treatises on how states should treat 
each other’s armies and civilian populations during wartime, these 
treatises were hardly practical sources for military officers in the 
middle of a war. No government had ever codified these practices 
into domestic law.365 As a result, there was no source for new 
officers to quickly learn the international laws and customs of land 
warfare. 
In the summer of 1862, Halleck had an opportunity to correct 
this deficiency when he was promoted to General-in-Chief of the 
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Union army. The previous year, he had become acquainted with 
Dr. Francis Lieber, a German immigrant and law professor at 
Columbia College in New York. Lieber had delivered a series of 
lectures at Columbia College entitled Twenty-Seven Definitions and 
Elementary Positions Concerning the Laws and Usages of War. Some of 
these lectures appeared in the New York Times and were noticed by 
Halleck.366 After reviewing Lieber’s work and corresponding with 
him, the two men became friendly. 
Halleck appointed Lieber to a special War Department Board 
tasked with developing a “code of regulations for the government 
of Armies in the field as authorized by the laws and usages of 
War.”367 Lieber was the only civilian on the board, which also 
included four military officers. Despite this, Lieber did all of the 
drafting.368 After revisions and additions, some of which were made 
by Halleck himself, the final draft was approved by President 
Lincoln on April 24, 1863, as General Orders No. 100: Instructions 
for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field.369 
Today, the document is more commonly referred to as the Lieber 
Code, named after its drafter. 
Enacted more than two months before the Minnesota Adjutant 
General issued the first bounty order on July 4, 1863, the Lieber 
Code contains several provisions that indicate the illegality of these 
bounty orders if the Dakota were considered lawful belligerents in 
a war with the United States. The Code notes that in modern wars, 
the object is not to kill the enemy. Killing is only a means to obtain 
the object that lies beyond the war.370 As a result, placing a bounty 
on the heads of enemy soldiers is not permitted. This is stated 
clearly by paragraph 148 of the Lieber Code: 
The law of war does not allow proclaiming either an 
individual belonging to the hostile army, or a citizen, or a 
subject of the hostile government an outlaw, who may be 
slain without trial by any captor, any more than the 
modern law of peace allows such international outlawry; 
on the contrary, it abhors such outrage. The sternest 
retaliation should follow the murder committed in 
consequence of such proclamation, made by whatever 
authority. Civilized nations look with horror upon offers 
 
 366.  Id. at 13. 
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of rewards for the assassination of enemies as relapses into 
barbarism.371 
Additionally, as applied, the bounty order violated other clear 
provisions of the Lieber Code. As described in II.B above, at least 
two of the bounties paid out by the Minnesota Adjutant General 
involved the killing of Dakota men who had already been wounded 
and were no longer a threat. The Lieber Code establishes that 
enemy soldiers that are already disabled must be taken as prisoners 
of war. Intentional acts that inflict additional wounds or result in 
the death of a disabled enemy soldier are violations of the law of 
war. If these acts can be proven, the soldier and anyone who 
encouraged or ordered the action can be sentenced to death.372 
The Lieber Code applied directly only to the “Armies of the 
United States in the Field.” It was not, therefore, directly applicable 
to the scouts employed by the State of Minnesota under the bounty 
orders. But the Lieber Code was, for the most part, merely a 
convenient codification of the international laws and customs of 
war. These laws and customs had long prohibited assassination of 
enemy troops for bounties, as well as the killing of disabled 
soldiers. In the 1855 decision of Jecker v. Montgomery, the U.S. 
Supreme Court stated that the laws of war form a portion of “the 
municipal jurisprudence of every country” without any 
congressional action.373 As a result, if the Dakota were a sovereign 
state engaged in a war with the United States, the bounty order as 
written and applied, constituted a violation of domestic and 
international law. 
B. Laws Relating to Guerrilla Warfare 
If the Dakota were not considered a sovereign state engaged in 
a war with the United States, then those persons involved in attacks 
or assaults on U.S. citizens could be considered part of a guerrilla 
force. Once again, the Union’s conduct during the Civil War is a 
resource to determine the contemporaneous definition and 
treatment of guerrilla parties. The western frontier of the Civil War 
was replete with armed groups that had only a tenuous connection 
to the Confederate government. Missouri, for example, had 
descended to “near anarchy,” as persons in plain clothes snuck 
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across Union lines to destroy infrastructure (e.g., roads, bridges, 
railroads) and kill both soldiers and civilians.374 
Halleck believed that these acts were violations of the laws of 
war and punishable by death, but Confederate officers argued 
otherwise.375 Convinced of his position, on March 13, 1862, Halleck 
issued General Orders No. 2, which warned citizens that if they 
“join any guerrilla band they will not, if captured, be treated as 
ordinary prisoners of war, but will be hung as robbers and 
murderers.”376 The real issue, however, was determining who 
should and should not be classified as a guerrilla group. 
In July and August 1862, Halleck wrote to Dr. Lieber and 
requested his assistance in determining how the laws of war defined 
guerrilla warfare.377 Lieber responded quickly to Halleck’s request 
by providing him with a lengthy essay entitled Guerrilla Parties 
Considered with Reference to the Laws and Usages of War, which 
contained a compendium of historical examples.378 In that 
document, Lieber defined a guerrilla party as “an irregular band of 
armed men, carrying on an irregular war.”379 The “irregularity” of 
the guerrilla band stemmed from the fact that it was both self-
constituted and separate in pay, provisions, and movements from 
the government’s army. Members of the band wore plain clothes 
and moved back and forth from civilian life to participation in 
armed raids.380 Guerrilla parties were especially dangerous because 
they could not be saddled with prisoners of war, prompting them 
to kill any captured soldiers.381 
According to Lieber, guerrilla members were not entitled to 
the protections of prisoners of war. In fact, Lieber indicated that at 
least in some circumstances it would be proper to execute a 
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guerrilla on the spot,382 without proceeding to a court-martial or 
military commission. Relaxation or mitigation of these rules was 
possible, however, and the most humane belligerents in recent 
times would provide that guerrillas captured in a fair fight be 
treated as a prisoner of war until it was proven that they were guilty 
of murder, destruction of property, or some other crime.383 Still, 
Lieber concluded that it was up to the executive and legislative 
branches to determine what mitigation, if any, would have a 
beneficial effect on the conduct of the war.384 Halleck agreed with 
the essay and ordered 5000 copies to be distributed to military 
personnel.385 
The Union army followed Halleck’s and Lieber’s approaches. 
If caught, guerrilla members were not entitled to prisoner-of-war 
status. The official policy was to speedily try suspected guerrillas 
and civilians who harbored or supported them by courts-martial or 
military commissions. In private and public communications, 
however, certain Union officers suggested that the proper 
approach was to shoot guerrillas on the spot rather than capture 
them. This was true even if they were unarmed.386 
For example, on April 21, 1862, Brigadier General James 
Totten, commanding officer for the District of Central Missouri, 
issued Special Orders No. 47, complaining that “jayhawkers, 
guerrillas, marauders, murderers and every species of outlaw are 
infesting to an alarming extent all the southwestern portion of 
Jackson County.”387 These guerrillas were frequently being 
harbored by civilians living there. The Special Order referred 
specifically to William Quantrill, noting that he was the “desperate 
leader of these outlaws.”388 It stated that “[a]ll those found in arms 
and open opposition to the laws and legitimate authorities who are 
known familiarly as guerrillas, jayhawkers, murderers, marauders, 
and horse-thieves, will be shot down by the military upon the 
spot.”389 Civilians who “knowingly harbored . . . these outlaws . . . 
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[would] be arrested and tried by a military commission for their 
offenses.”390 
Even though the treatment of guerrillas was harsh during the 
Civil War, the Union does not appear to have authorized bounties 
for killing them. On certain occasions, Union officers did offer 
rewards for the capture of specific persons,391 but there is no 
indication that such rewards would be paid if the person were 
killed. Instead, “dead or alive” bounties were reserved only for 
notorious criminals operating outside of war times. Thus, if the 
Dakota were considered guerillas, they could have been legally 
executed (even on the spot) for their crimes. But this was only true 
for those specific Dakota who were actually engaged in hostilities 
against the United States, and it does not explain the bounty system 
put in place by either the federal or state governments. 
IV. TESTING THE LEGALITY OF MINNESOTA’S BOUNTY SYSTEM 
A. The Dakota as Sovereigns Capable of Declaring War 
As the above discussion indicates, one of the crucial questions 
that must be answered in determining the legality of the Minnesota 
Adjutant General’s bounties orders is whether the Dakota should 
have been treated as lawful belligerents or merely guerrillas. 
Answering this question requires resort to contemporaneous 
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and statements made by 
executive branch officials about the status of Indian tribes 
generally, as well as more specific interactions with and statements 
about the Minnesota Dakota communities. 
By 1863, the U.S. Supreme Court had a long history of treating 
Indian tribes as sovereign states. In its 1831 decision in Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia, the Court refused to exercise original jurisdiction 
over a lawsuit brought by the Cherokee Nation because it 
 
 390.  Id. 
 391.  For example, in April 1865, the United States authorized a $2000 reward 
for the capture of John Mosby when he refused to surrender with the rest of his 
men. Letter from Major-Gen. Winfield Hancock to Sec’y of War Edwin Stanton 
(Apr. 22, 1865), in 46 U.S. DEP’T OF WAR, WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, Part III 
897, 897 (1894) (“Some of Mosby’s own men are in pursuit of him for a reward of 
$2,000 . . . .”). That reward was later increased to $5000 at the request of Grant 
and Halleck. Letter from Gen. Ulysses Grant to Major-Gen. Henry Halleck (May 4, 
1865), in 46 WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, Part III, supra, at 1082; Letter from 
Major-Gen. Henry Halleck to commanding officer at Charlottesville, Va. (May 18, 
1865), in 46 WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, Part III, supra, at 1173. 
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concluded that Indian tribes were not foreign states within the 
meaning of Article III of the U.S. Constitution.392 Still, a majority of 
the Court did agree with Cherokee contention that it was a “state” 
in the sense of being “a distinct political society, separated from 
others, capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself.”393 
Chief Justice John Marshall described Indian tribes as “domestic 
dependent nations”394 and said that the United States had 
recognized them “as a people capable of maintaining the relations 
of peace and war.”395 
Chief Justice Marshall’s vision of the federal-tribal relationship 
was confirmed by a majority of the Court just one year later in 
Worcester v. Georgia.396 In Worcester, the Court overturned the 
criminal convictions of two missionaries who had failed to obtain a 
license mandated by the state of Georgia for all persons residing in 
Cherokee Territory.397 Speaking for the Court, Marshall held the 
Georgia statute unlawful under the Supremacy Clause.398 Marshall 
concluded that Indian tribes “had always been considered as 
distinct, independent political communities retaining their original 
natural rights.”399 Therefore, the Cherokee Nation was “a distinct 
community occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately 
described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force.”400 In a 
 
 392.  Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). The Cherokee 
Nation was seeking to enjoin enforcement of Georgia statutes that purported to 
annul the Nation’s laws, confiscate Cherokee lands, and extend state laws over all 
persons residing on those lands. Id. at 15. In holding that the Court could not 
exercise jurisdiction over the lawsuit, Chief Justice Marshall pointed to Article I, 
section 8, clause 3, which is the only place where Indian tribes are mentioned in 
the U.S. Constitution. That clause empowers Congress to “regulate commerce with 
foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.” In 
determining that Indian tribes were not foreign nations, Marshall emphasized the 
fact that Indian tribes were contradistinguished from foreign nations by name in 
this clause. Id. at 18–19. 
 393.  Id. at 16. Chief Justice Marshall wrote the opinion and was joined only by 
Justice McLean. Justices Johnson and Baldwin concurred in the result, but 
believed that tribes possessed no sovereignty. Justices Thompson and Story 
dissented, arguing that the Cherokee Nation was a foreign state. As a result, a 
majority of the Justices held that the Cherokee Nation was a state (Marshall, 
McLean, Thompson, and Story), but not a foreign state (Marshall, McLean, 
Johnson, and Baldwin). Id. 
 394.  Id. at 17.  
 395.  Id. at 16. 
 396.  31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
 397.  Id. at 538–39. 
 398.  Id. at 561–62. 
 399.  Id. at 559. 
 400.  Id. at 561. 
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concurring opinion, Justice McLean discussed the ability of Indian 
tribes to declare war against the United States: 
We have recognised in them the right to make war. No 
one has ever supposed that the Indians could commit 
treason against the United States. We have punished them 
for their violation of treaties; but we have inflicted the 
punishment on them as a nation, and not on individual 
offenders among them as traitors.401 
Read together, Cherokee Nation and Worcester recognized that Indian 
tribes were “states” as that term is used in international law, 
possessed territorial sovereignty, and had the right to declare war 
against the United States. 
In the decades that followed Cherokee Nation and Worcester, 
some doubt as to the status of Indian tribes crept into federal court 
decisions. In the 1846 decision in United States v. Rogers, the 
Supreme Court addressed whether a white settler adopted into the 
Cherokee Nation should be considered an Indian for purposes of 
federal criminal statutes.402 If both the defendant and victim were 
Indians, then the federal government could not prosecute any 
crimes between them. If the defendant and/or victim were non-
Indian, then the federal government could initiate a federal 
prosecution pursuant to a provision in the Trade & Intercourse 
Acts.403 Chief Justice Taney wrote the unanimous opinion for the 
 
 401.  Id. at 583. 
 402.  45 U.S. 567, 571 (1846). The leading scholarly work on Rogers is Bethany 
R. Berger, “Power Over This Unfortunate Race”: Race, Politics and Indian Law in 
United States v. Rogers, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1957 (2004). 
 403.  Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 25, 4 Stat. 729 (“[M]uch of the laws of the 
United States as provides for the punishment of crimes committed within any 
place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, shall be in 
force in the Indian country: Provided, The same shall not extend to crimes 
committed by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian.”). 
Today, this provision, as amended, is referred to as the Indian Country Crimes 
Act, the General Crimes Act, or the Interracial Crimes Act. It is codified at 
18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012).  
In Rogers, both the defendant and victim were white men who had been 
adopted into the Cherokee Nation by virtue of their marriages to Cherokee 
women. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 568. Thus, if the defendant was not considered 
Cherokee, his victim must have been considered non-Indian as well. Decades later, 
the Supreme Court held that if both the defendant and victim are non-Indian, the 
federal government lacks jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed in Indian 
country within an existing state, despite the explicit language of the Indian 
Country Crimes Act. Instead, those crimes fall to the state to prosecute. See, e.g., 
Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896); United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 
622 (1881). These decisions are not necessarily inconsistent with Rogers, however, 
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Court, which claimed—without reference to Cherokee Nation or 
Worcester—that Indian tribes “have never been acknowledged or 
treated as independent nations by the European governments.”404 
Instead, the Court argued that they were subject to the authority of 
the federal government because they had been incorporated within 
the territory of the United States through the doctrine of 
discovery.405 
Confusion can also be found in United States v. Coxe, decided in 
1855.406 Writing on behalf of a unanimous court, Justice McLean 
began by seemingly reaffirming the Cherokee Nation and Worcester 
decisions (although once again, without reference to either). 
McLean stated that the Cherokee Nation could not be considered a 
foreign state, but the Cherokee people were still governed by their 
own laws, and the federal government “guarantee[d] their 
independence” from the states.407 The Court went on, however, and 
reasoned that Indian tribes were under the U.S. Constitution, and 
that the Cherokee Nation should be considered “a domestic 
territory—a territory which originated under our constitution and 
laws.”408 If Indian tribes were domestic territories under “our 
constitution and laws,” could they declare a lawful war against the 
United States? While this was not at issue in Coxe, it would appear 
that Justice McLean’s formulation of Cherokee sovereignty could 
lead to the conclusion that Indian tribes engaged in hostilities 
against the United States were part of a rebellion or uprising and; 
therefore, not entitled to the protections of the international law of 
war. 
Despite the language in Rogers and Coxe, several other Supreme 
Court decisions continued to recognize both that tribal sovereignty 
was independent of U.S. sovereignty and that Indian tribes could 
 
because the latter involved a crime committed outside of any state in the Indian 
Territory. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 571–72 (“The country in which the crime is charged to 
have been committed is a part of the territory of the United States, and not within 
in [sic] the limits of any particular State.”). 
 404.  Rogers, 45 U.S. at 572. The opinion actually did not cite any legal 
authorities other than the 1834 Trade & Intercourse Act and the Cherokee Treaty 
of New Echota. Id. at 572–73. 
 405.  Id. The doctrine of discovery gave European nations and their successors 
in interest title to the lands they had “discovered,” but that title was subject to the 
Indians’ aboriginal occupancy rights. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 573 
(1823). 
 406.  59 U.S. 100 (1855). 
 407.  Id. at 103. 
 408.  Id. at 103–04. 
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wage lawful wars against the United States. For example, in an 1850 
case entitled Parks v. Ross, the Court was asked to hold the 
Cherokee Nation’s principal chief, John Ross, personally liable for 
damages under a contract executed with an individual who had 
provided wagons and horses to assist Nation members in their 
forced relocation to the Indian Territory.409 It refused to do so. 
The Court noted that it was settled law that public officers acting 
for their government were not personally liable for contracts made 
in their official capacity.410 The unanimous opinion written by 
Justice Grier held that this precedent applied to John Ross, who was 
acting as a public officer of the Cherokee Nation at the time he 
signed the contract in question. In doing so, the Court noted that 
“[t]he Cherokees are in many respects a foreign and independent 
nation. They are governed by their own laws and officers, chosen by 
themselves.”411 
Dicta in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1856 decision in Dred Scott v. 
Sanford 412 also supports the notion that Indian tribes should have 
been considered lawful belligerents if they declared war against the 
United States. In that decision, authored by Chief Justice Taney—
the same Justice who had authored the Rogers decision ten years 
earlier—the Court stated: 
These Indian Governments were regarded and treated as 
foreign Governments . . . and their freedom has 
constantly been acknowledged, from the time of the first 
emigration to the English colonies to the present day, by 
the different Governments which succeeded each other. 
Treaties have been negotiated with them, and their 
alliance sought for in war; and the people who compose 
these Indian political communities have always been 
treated as foreigners not living under our Government.413 
Consequently, at the time of the U.S.-Dakota War in 
Minnesota, while the question was not free from doubt, the Rogers 
and Coxe decisions appear to have been outliers. Elements of these 
decisions would later gain sway in the Supreme Court during the 
assimilation era of Federal Indian policy,414 but prior to 1863, these 
 
 409.  52 U.S. 362, 373–74 (1850). 
 410.  Id. at 374. 
 411.  Id. 
 412.  60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
 413.  Id. at 404. 
 414.  See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381–82 (1886) (referring 
to tribes as “local dependent communities,” rather than “domestic dependent 
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were the only times in twenty-eight Indian-law related decisions that 
the Supreme Court failed to acknowledge tribal sovereignty as 
inherent and distinct from the United States.415 The language in 
Cherokee Nation, Worcester, Parks, and Dred Scott supports the notion 
that Indian tribes were sovereigns capable of declaring war against 
the United States or serving as an ally to the United States during 
war. 
The actions of the executive branch also support the 
interpretation that Indian tribes generally, and the Dakota 
specifically, were sovereigns capable of declaring war against the 
United States. For example, in 1828, Attorney General William Wirt 
was asked to opine as to whether the Creek Nation could be held 
liable for certain property destruction that occurred in Georgia 
prior to 1802, when the Creek were at war with the United States.416 
In a lengthy opinion, Wirt concluded that “[l]ike all other 
independent nations, [the Creek] have the absolute power of war 
and peace,” and unless their treaties with the United States 
provided otherwise, they were not liable for such damages.417 
Another example can be found in an opinion issued by the 
U.S. Attorney General in 1873.418 Between 1872 and 1873, the 
United States was engaged in an armed conflict with a band of the 
Modoc tribe, led by Kintpuash, better known as Captain Jack.419 
In January 1873, the Secretary of the Interior appointed a peace 
commission to negotiate with Captain Jack in an effort to end the 
war.420 At a negotiation session in April 1873, the Modoc killed two 
 
nations,” and noting that they had a semi-independent position “not as states, not 
as nations, not as possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as separate 
people, with the power of regulating their internal and social relations”). 
 415.  See, e.g., Blake A. Watson, The Thrust and Parry of Federal Indian Law, 23 
U. DAYTON L. REV. 437 (1998) (collecting cases). In fact, the closest the Court 
came to questioning tribal sovereignty after Rogers was in Fellows v. Blacksmith in 
1856. 60 U.S. 366 (1856). In that case, the Court still referred to the Seneca 
Nation “as a quasi nation, possessing some of the attributes of an independent 
people.” Id. at 371. 
 416.  Georgia and the Treaty of Indian Spring, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 110 (1828). 
 417.  Id. at 133. 
 418.  While this opinion was issued after the U.S.-Dakota War had ended, there 
is no indication that it was based on a change in governmental policy. 
 419.  ROBERT M. UTLEY & WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, INDIAN WARS 250 (2002); 
JEROME A. GREENE, INDIAN WAR VETERANS: MEMORIES OF ARMY LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS 
IN THE WEST, 1864–1898, at 306–07 (2012) (account of Oliver Applegate, a captain 
in the Oregon Militia).  
 420.  ARTHUR QUINN, HELL WITH THE FIRE OUT: A HISTORY OF THE MODOC WAR 
85–86 (1997). 
 
66 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:1 
members of the U.S. Peace Party, General Canby and Reverend 
Thomas, during negotiations.421 When the war ended a month 
later, Colonel Jefferson Davis (no relation to the former 
Confederate President) decided to execute between eight and ten 
Modocs. He believed the Modoc were “a band of outlaws, robbers 
and murderers,” and as the field commander, he had the authority 
and “no doubt of the propriety and the necessity of executing them 
on the spot, at once.”422 Others were not as sure. President Grant 
asked for an opinion from the U.S. Attorney General, George 
Williams. 
Williams concluded that the international laws of war should 
apply to the conflict with the Modoc, who were lawful belligerents: 
That these hostile Indians were and are a distinct people 
and therefore capable of legal and legitimate war with the 
United States seems to me to be open to no doubt. They 
are in no sense citizens of the United States, and owe it no 
allegiance; they are governed by their own laws and owe 
no obedience, and pay none, to the laws of the country in 
which they live. . . . They are dealt with only by the 
General Government through the instrumentality of 
treaties, which treaties are an evidence and 
acknowledgment of their independent position as distinct 
peoples.423 
Williams noted that the Lieber Code and the laws of war required 
that “a regular unoffending soldier of the opposing party to the 
war” should be treated with “courtesy and kindness” as a prisoner 
of war.424 Soldiers who had violated the laws of war, such as by 
acting as a spy, breaking their parole, or operating as a 
“bushwhacker, a jayhawker, a bandit, a war-rebel, [or] an assassin,” 
should be tried by a military commission if there was no statutory 
grant of authority enabling them to be subject to a courts-martial.425 
Williams concluded that the laws of war acknowledged that a flag of 
truce, dispatched in good faith, was sacred. The assassination of the 
bearer of a flag of truce was the “great[est] act of perfidy and 
treachery,” and should result in the trial of Captain Jack and the 
other Modoc responsible.426 
 
 421.  GREENE, supra note 419, at 308. 
 422.  QUINN, supra note 420, at 175. 
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 424.  The Modoc Indian Prisoners, 14 Op. Att’y. Gen. 249, 251–52 (1873). 
 425.  Id. at 250–52. 
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The Attorney General’s opinion was followed. Six Modoc were 
tried (without the benefit of a lawyer or interpreter), convicted, 
and sentenced to death by a military commission for killing U.S. 
officials under a flag of truce.427 President Grant approved the 
death sentence for Captain Jack and three other Modoc while 
commuting the sentence of the remaining two to life 
imprisonment.428 The remainder of the Modoc who participated in 
the 1872 war—approximately 160 men, women, and children—
were treated as prisoners of war and sent east to the Indian 
Territory.429 These actions clearly demonstrate that the United 
States treated the Modoc as lawful belligerents, which requires that 
the conduct of war be governed by the international laws of war 
and the Lieber Code. 
There is no reason that the Dakota should have been treated 
differently.430 By 1862, the Dakota had already entered into treaties 
with the United States in 1805, 1825, 1837, 1851, and 1858.431 Each 
one of these treaties is necessarily an acknowledgment of Dakota 
sovereignty, and lawful belligerent status flows from this 
sovereignty. In a January 1863 address to the Minnesota legislature, 
Minnesota Governor Ramsey acknowledged that the Dakota were, 
like other Indian tribes, “independent nations, competent to 
declare war, to make laws for their own guidance, and to hold and 
dispose of property,” even while he urged that this status should be 
 
 427.  UTLEY & WASHBURN, supra note 419, at 253. 
 428.  See id. 
 429.  Id. at 254. 
 430.  Professor Finkelman claims that the Dakota should not be viewed as 
sovereigns in 1862 because the Dakota had ceded most of their land in Minnesota 
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become so degraded or reduced in numbers, as to lose the power of self-
government, the protection of the local law, of necessity, must be extended over 
them.” Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 593 (1832). But McLean’s theory was 
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 431.  See sources cited supra note 22 and sources cited infra notes 437–38. 
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changed.432 The fact that Governor Ramsey—who was certainly no 
friend to the Dakota—held this view shows just how settled it was at 
the commencement of the U.S.-Dakota War in 1862. 
B. The Dakota Decision to Go to War 
A few legal scholars and historians claim that even though the 
Dakota were sovereigns, the individuals who fought the United 
States in the fall of 1862 should not receive lawful belligerent status 
because the tribe as a whole never declared war against the United 
States. In support of this assertion, some have emphasized that 
many of the principal chiefs of both the Lower Dakota and Upper 
Dakota, including Wabasha, Wacouta, Traveling Hail, Red Iron, 
and Standing Buffalo, were opposed to the War.433 Others have 
focused on the fact that many Dakota, particularly those who had 
converted to Christianity and become farmers, were opposed to the 
War from its inception.434 Therefore, according to this viewpoint, 
the War was simply the work of a hostile minority.435 If this is true, 
then the actions of the Dakota in 1862 and 1863 could be 
analogized to guerrilla warfare and might be punished as mere 
criminal behavior, rather than the protected actions of a lawful 
belligerent under the international law of war. 
This approach, however, seems to gloss over both the 
governmental structure of the Dakota in 1862, and the means that 
the Dakota used to reach decisions. Each Dakota band was a 
separate political unit with the ability to make decisions that 
affected their own citizens. Thus, the Dakota were more properly 
thought of as a confederacy: individual bands that may be united in 
pursuit of a common goal, but need not be.436 This is evident in the 
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very name of the tribe—Dakota—which means “Allied People.”437 
For this reason, the decisions and actions of individual bands 
should be considered, not simply those of the entire Dakota tribe. 
At a minimum, the United States recognized the independent 
sovereignty of the Mdewakanton, Wahpekute, Sisseton, and 
Wahpeton bands. The clearest example of this can be found in the 
treaties between the United States and the Dakota. Those treaties 
sometimes included only the Mdewakanton bands,438 only the 
Lower Dakota bands (Mdewakanton and Wahpekute), or only the 
Upper Dakota bands (Sisseton and Wahpeton).439 
Additionally, focusing on the individual beliefs of Dakota 
chiefs440 is improper, since they could neither make laws nor 
execute them. Decisions were made democratically, by consensus 
or at least majority vote, in large councils.441 If the decision would 
affect the entire nation, multiple bands would usually be 
represented at the council.442 Chiefs played an important role in 
council, gathering support for their views through oratory.443 But 
they did not have authoritarian power.444 
 
OF THE AMERICAN ABORIGINES 23 (1881) (referring to the Dakota League of the 
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Finally, it is important to recognize that the traditional Dakota 
governmental system had been placed under considerable strain 
since the 1830s and was beginning to break down. Chiefs had 
become more susceptible to the machinations of white traders, and 
their influence among the Dakota had diminished.445 The United 
States’ assimilation programs had created deep divides between 
those “farmer Indians” who had adopted western attire, 
Christianity, and farming, and the traditionalists or “blanket 
Indians” who had refused to do so. At first, this made consensus 
more difficult to obtain; later, it became nearly impossible.446 As 
white traders and farmer Indians began to assert more control over 
council proceedings, an old organization—the soldiers’ lodge—
began to take on a new role. Traditionally, the soldiers’ lodge 
served many functions, including operating as a police force to 
carry out the will of the council, organizing and controlling hunts, 
and protecting the village from outside threats.447 Now, the soldiers’ 
lodge began to operate more as a decision-making body, and it 
precluded mixed-bloods and farmer Indians from participating.448 
This background discussion is necessary to demonstrate that in 
determining whether the Dakota declared war on the United States 
in 1862, the focus should not be on the views of individual chiefs, 
but rather, on whether (1) councils were held, and if so, which 
bands participated in those councils; or (2) the soldiers’ lodge 
convened, and if so, whether that lodge had expanded its powers 
by 1862 to enable it to declare war and not simply execute one 
already authorized by the council. Some scholars have argued that 
the council system was used and a decision was made to go to war. 
For example, Carol Chomsky, the leading scholar on the military 
trials held in the fall of 1862, has acknowledged that there was 
dissension among the Dakota and the decision to go to war was 
made with great haste, but she still concluded that the Dakota must 
be considered legitimate belligerents because “[c]ouncils were held 
and group decisions were made, both to begin and to continue the 
fighting.”449 Alternatively, Gary Clayton Anderson, a noted authority 
on the Dakota during this time period, claimed that the decision to 
 
people. It was important for their bands to be well represented, so as to develop a 
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go to war was made by “a minority of warriors from the 
Mdewakanton soldiers’ lodges: a tribal or band council never even 
met to consider the prospect of war.”450 A closer look at the events 
of August 17, 1862, is therefore necessary.451 
On that August night, the Dakota men responsible for the 
killings at Acton returned to their homes at the Rice Creek 
Village.452 There, they consulted with their headman, Red Middle 
Voice, and convened a council of the soldiers’ lodge.453 There was 
concern that the whites would seek widespread retaliation for these 
murders, and that the annuity payment would now either be 
permanently withheld or at the very least, withheld until the 
responsible persons had been surrendered.454 Middle Voice 
decided to seek the opinion of Chief Shakopee, whose village was 
nearby,455 and Shakopee decided that a council of chiefs should be 
convened that night at Taoyateduta’s village.456 Runners were sent 
to the heads of the Mdewakanton and Wahpekute bands.457 
At the council, it was apparent that the young traditionalists 
who led the soldiers’ lodge were in favor of a war, while the older 
leaders of the Mdewakanton and Wahpekute bands were 
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of young warriors who, dissatisfied with life on the Reservation, had deliberately 
moved north of the mouth of the Redwood River into an area that had been 
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of Chief Shakopee’s band. 3 LUCIUS F. HUBBARD & RETURN I. HOLCOMBE, 
MINNESOTA IN THREE CENTURIES 274, 302 (1908). 
 453.  ANDERSON, LITTLE CROW, supra note 1, at 130–31; ANDERSON, KINSMEN, 
supra note 28, at 253–54. 
 454.  ANDERSON, KINSMEN, supra note 28, at 253. 
 455.  3 HUBBARD & HOLCOMBE, supra note 452, at 274, 311. 
 456.  MEYER, supra note 34, at 117. 
 457.  2 FOLWELL, supra note 7, at 240; 3 HUBBARD & HOLCOMBE, supra note 452, 
at 312. 
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opposed.458 Taoyateduta and other leaders had been to 
Washington, DC, to negotiate the 1858 Treaty. Their trip to the 
country’s capital had shown them the strength of the United States 
and the futility of a war. Taoyateduta tried to communicate this 
futility to the young Dakota warriors, but they insisted on a war, and 
the band leaders—who did not have coercive power in the Dakota 
governmental system—could not convince them otherwise.459 The 
young men called Taoyateduta a coward, and eventually, seeing 
that there was no way to convince those men that a war would be 
unsuccessful, Taoyateduta agreed to lead them into battle.460 
Sources indicate that leaders from many of the Mdewakanton 
and Wahpekute bands were present on the evening of August 17, 
1862, along with at least one hundred members of the soldiers’ 
lodge.461 Big Eagle was present, and in his account he stated that 
Wabasha, the head Mdewakanton chief, and Wacouta (also spelled 
Wakute), another Mdewakanton chief, were also there.462 Modern 
authors have claimed that other Mdewakanton chiefs, including 
Traveling Hail, the recently elected speaker of the Dakota, and 
Chief Mankato, were present on this night for deliberations.463 Big 
Eagle’s account seems to settle this scholarly debate by stating that 
“[a] council was held and war was declared.”464 
If these accounts are accurate, a majority of the Mdewakanton 
chiefs—Wabasha, Wacouta, Taoyateduta, Shakopee, Red Middle 
Voice, Traveling Hail, and Mankato—would have been present on 
August 17, 1862, lending greater credibility to the conclusion that 
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 459.  Id. 
 460.  Being called a coward struck a nerve with Taoyateduta. He had recently 
lost an election to remain speaker for the Dakota; the much younger Traveling 
Hail had taken his place. DOANE ROBINSON, A HISTORY OF THE DAKOTA OR SIOUX 
INDIANS 264 (1967). Taoyateduta famously responded: “You will die like the rabbits 
when hungry wolves hunt them in the Hard Moon (January). Taoyateduta is not a 
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1962, at 115. 
 461.  ANDERSON, LITTLE CROW, supra note 1, at 130–31 (noting that the 
soldiers’ lodge consisted of no more than one hundred men). 
 462.  THROUGH DAKOTA EYES, supra note 8, at 36.  
 463.  CARLEY, supra note 2, at 11, 12 (claiming, without citation, that “riders 
were sent to summon such leaders as Mankato, Wabasha, Traveling Hail, and Big 
Eagle to the war council at Little Crow’s house” and that Wabasha advocated 
against the War during the council); DAHLIN, DAKOTA UPRISING, supra note 2, at 71 
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deliberations on the early morning of August 18, 1862). 
 464.  THROUGH DAKOTA EYES, supra note 8, at 36. 
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this was a traditional council, at least for the Mdewakanton bands. 
But there are reasons to doubt the presence of some of these 
chiefs. Wabasha claimed that he only found out about the war 
when the attack was occurring on August 18 and that he 
immediately sent word to chiefs Wacouta and Red Legs, “who had 
not yet heard of the outbreak.”465 Additionally, it seems unlikely 
that Traveling Hail would have been summoned to this meeting, 
since he was supportive of the “farmer Indians,” rather than the 
soldiers’ lodge.466 
Regardless of who was present on that night, most of the 
Mdewakanton and Wahpekute chiefs led their warriors into battle 
during the course of the fall of 1862, thereby seemingly ratifying 
the decision that had been made at that first council.467 
Furthermore, throughout the hostilities, numerous additional 
council meetings were held where representatives of nearly all of 
the bands were present.468 Faced with these facts, it is hard to 
conclude that a formal war was not commenced by the Lower 
Dakota bands. 
The Upper Dakota bands (i.e., Sisseton and Wahpeton), 
however, are a different matter. Neither their young men nor their 
leaders were involved in the initial decision to go to war. They 
found out about the war the next day, after the attack on the Lower 
Agency. A council of Sisseton and Wahpeton chiefs was 
 
 465.  Id. at 30–31. At least one historian has called Big Eagle’s claim that 
Wabasha and Wacouta were present on the evening of August 17, 1862, 
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representatives of the soldiers’ lodge by telling them they should consult with 
Traveling Hail, the newly elected speaker, instead. Id. This would make little sense 
if Traveling Hail were already present for these discussions. 
 467.  Big Eagle fought in the second battle of Fort Ridgley, the battle of New 
Ulm, and the battle of Birch Coulee, the latter with about thirty warriors from his 
band. He was also present at the battle of Wood Lake, observing it with 
Taoyateduta and some other chiefs from a hill on the west side. DAHLIN, DAKOTA 
UPRISING, supra note 2, at 40. Chief Mankato participated in the battles of Fort 
Ridgley, New Ulm, Birch Coulee, and Wood Lake. He was killed during the latter 
battle. Id. at 71. Wabasha was present at the battles of Fort Ridgley, Birch Coulee, 
and New Ulm. Id. at 98. Wacouta fought at the battle of Fort Ridgely. Id. at 224. 
Red Legs was a Wahpekute chief and one of the leaders at the battle of Birch 
Coulee. Id. at 226. 
 468.  BERG, supra note 9, at 104–07, 114–15, 151, 157. 
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immediately convened.469 John Other Day, head of one of the 
Wahpeton bands of “farmer Indians,” argued against the war, 
stating: “We are a different tribe. Their actions are nothing to us. 
I do not want to see a white man killed.”470 Walking Iron (also 
known as Iron Walker or Mazomani), another Wahpeton chief, 
replied that the Mdewakantons were their relatives and it was “too 
late for us to keep aloof from this trouble” since the whites would 
hold them all responsible irrespective of their actual participation 
in the war.471 Ultimately, the Wahpetons advocated for emptying 
the traders’ stores but not killing anyone.472 White Lodge and most 
of the Sisseton chiefs who were present were in favor of joining the 
war, especially upon hearing that Captain Marsh’s company had 
been eliminated at Red Wood Agency.473 The chiefs broke the 
council with no consensus being reached.474 
Throughout the fall of 1862, many of these Upper Dakota 
bands continued to refuse to participate in the hostilities, and 
instead, they rendered aid to fleeing white settlers while refusing to 
do the same for the Lower Dakota bands.475 The Upper Dakota 
then could reasonably be seen as not having declared war against 
the United States. That should not, however, have precluded 
individual band members from changing their allegiance, joining 
the Lower Dakota’s war efforts, and achieving the protections of 
lawful belligerents in the conflict.476 
C. Federal Acknowledgement of the War 
The conclusion that a formal war was declared against the 
United States, at least by the Lower Dakota bands, is also supported 
by contemporaneous statements and actions of federal and state 
officials. Throughout the fighting in August and September 1862, 
 
 469.  THROUGH DAKOTA EYES, supra note 8, at 120 (interview with John Other 
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 470.  WHIPPLE, supra note 7, at 119. 
 471.  Id. 
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those officials described the conflict between the Dakota and the 
United States as a “war.” Minnesota Governor Alexander Ramsey 
gave status reports to President Lincoln and Secretary of War 
Stanton about “the Indian war” in the state,477 and when action 
seemed to lag at the federal level, he implored Lincoln to provide 
them with resources, noting “[t]his is not our war; it is a national 
war.”478 Official correspondence sent by Brigadier General Henry 
Hastings Sibley,479 Commissioner of Indian Affairs William Dole,480 
Minnesota Adjutant General Oscar Malmros,481 General John 
Pope,482 and General Halleck483 all referred to the fighting between 
the Dakota and the United States as a “war.” 
During the fighting, General Sibley also took specific actions 
demonstrating that he believed the conflict to be a war between 
lawful belligerents. For example, on several occasions Sibley 
communicated with Dakota forces under a flag of truce and he 
informed his superiors, including General Pope, of this fact.484 This 
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1862), in 13 WAR OF THE REBELLION, SER. I, supra note 2, at 724. 
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 484.  Report of Colonel Henry Sibley to Governor Alexander Ramsey (Sept. 
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is important because flags of truce could only be exchanged with 
enemy belligerents in a war, not with guerrillas or common 
criminals.485 Despite being informed of this practice on numerous 
occasions throughout the fighting, General Pope only objected in 
October 1862, after the fighting had ended for the year. He then 
told Sibley, “I only regret that you even permitted a flag of truce to 
be used with them.” 486 The inference that can be drawn from this 
statement is that General Pope was well aware that the use of a flag 
of truce was acknowledgement of the lawful status of the opposing 
force. 
Even those outside of the military were aware of the impact of 
a flag of truce. On November 12, Bishop Whipple wrote Senator 
Rice and asked him to deliver a letter to President Lincoln. In his 
letter to Rice he stated: 
We cannot hang men by the hundreds. Upon our own 
premises we have no right to do so. We claim that they are 
an independent nation & as such they are prisoners of 
war. The leaders must be punished but we cannot afford 
by any wanton cruelty to purchase a long Indian war—nor 
by injustice in other matters purchase the anger of God.487 
Whipple later confronted Sibley in correspondence: “The civilized 
world cannot justify the trial by a military commission of men who 
voluntarily came in under a flag of truce.”488 
The tougher question, however, is whether a state of war could 
be said to still exist in 1863, when the Minnesota Adjutant General 
issued his order. Most of the fighting concluded in September 
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1862, and by the beginning of October, General Pope had 
announced that “[t]he Sioux war may be considered at an end.”489 
But Taoyateduta had not been captured, and he fled westward 
along with at least 150 persons. It appears that General Halleck had 
it right when he wrote that “[t]he Indian war in [Minnesota] is 
deemed to be ended for the season.”490 
CONCLUSION 
Federal, state, and local governments all had a hand in 
creating the bounty system that provided monetary rewards for the 
killing of Dakota men beginning in 1863. This system was illegal 
from its inception because the Dakota were engaged in a war with 
the United States and were entitled to the status of lawful 
belligerents under both the international laws of war and the 
domestically created Lieber Code. Yet despite this, the bounty 
system remained in Minnesota for years, and similar systems existed 
in other states such as California and Arizona. While many scholars 
today refer to this time period as the “Reservation Era,” it could 
also be viewed as the “Extermination Era,” an ugly bit of our 
collective history where elected officials advocated for the mass 
murder of Indian people. The story of the U.S.-Dakota War is 
incomplete without this history. 
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